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. INTRODUCTION
When Sigmund Freud was once asked what the most important thing in
life was, he responded: "Love and work."I Similarly, Shakespeare once said
"You take my life when you take the means whereby I live." 2 When read
together, the quotes of Sigmund Freud and William Shakespeare underscore
the importance of work, particularly the loss of work due to race-based
discrimination. 3 These statements further underscore the importance of laws
and public policies that are designed and intended to prohibit workplace
discrimination based on immutable characteristics such as race, sex, national
origin, religion, disability, age, marital status, and sexual orientation.4
The first purpose of this article is to provide the reader with a "mini-
primer" on the history and overview of the use of private conflict
management systems and alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") processes
such as labor and employment arbitration and mediation within the context of
resolving race- or ethnicity-based discrimination in the workplace. 5
The second purpose of this article is to introduce the relatively recent
concepts of "modem racism or discrimination," "unconscious," and "subtle
discrimination" in the workplace. The third purpose is to discuss a number of
the realities related to the current way Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 are being enforced, and how the various courts of appeal are
I MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, ANDRIA S. KNAPP & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 21 (1987).
2 Id.
3 See generally, e.g., WILLIAM H. GRIER & PRICE M. COBBS, BLACK RAGE (2d ed.
1992).
4 See generally DISCRIMINATION AT WORK: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
ORGANIZATIONAL BASES (Robert L. Dipboye & Adrienne Colella eds., 2005) (explaining
the various types of discrimination and how discrimination works). Although the focus of
this article is primarily on race- or ethnic-based discrimination, the discussions, concerns,
and recommendations are in many instances applicable to members of other protected
groups. The proposed National Employment Dispute Resolution Act would also apply to
members of other protected groups and covers claims such as sexual and racial
harassment.
5 See DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Douglas H. Yarn ed., 1999)
(providing definitions of conflict resolution and ADR terms). See also David A.
Hoffman, The ABC's ofADR: A Glossary ofDispute Resolution Methods, Mass. Lawyers
Weekly, Sept. 6, 1993, at 115-18; HENRY S. KRAMER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN THE WORKPLACE (1998) (outlining workplace dispute resolution).
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reversing a disproportionately greater number of verdicts favorable to
plaintiffs than appealed cases of respondent employers.
The fourth purpose is to provide the reader with the legal and ADR
public policy context within which employment discrimination disputes have
been and are currently being resolved, pursuant to relevant court decisions,
policies, and protocols implemented by the EEOC, the federal courts, and
private employers. This includes the Supreme Court's decisions in Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver, Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson/Lane, Circuit City, Inc. v.
Adams, and 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett.6
Lastly, with this background and through this experiential-based prism,
the authors recommend the enactment of legislation entitled the "National
Employment Dispute Resolution Act" (NEDRA). NEDRA would require
certain covered federal contractors and recipients of federal funds to
implement legitimate internal conflict management systems designed to
afford EEO/employment disputants early access to ADR processes such as
ombudspersons, private fact-finders, and mediators. Because NEDRA would
apply to certain federal contractors and recipients of federal funds, the
authors further propose that NEDRA be enacted as a Presidential Executive
Order.7
6 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,
532 U.S. 105 (2001); 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S.Ct. 1456 (2009).
7 See, e.g., Kenneth R. Mayer & Kevin Price, Unilateral Presidential Powers:
Significant Executive Orders, 1949-99, 32 Presidential Studies Quarterly 367, 367-386
(2002); see generally KENNETH R. MAYER, WITH THE STROKE OF A PEN: EXECUTIVE
ORDERS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWERs (2002); DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN (1992);
RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS: THE
POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN (1990); JAMES Q. WILSON,
BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND WHY THEY Do IT (1989); Phillip
J. Cooper, By Order of the President: Administration by Executive Order and
Proclamation, 18 ADMIN. & Soc'Y 233, 233-62 (1986); Christopher J. Deering & Forrest
Maltzman, The Politics of Executive Orders: Legislative Constraints on Presidential
Power, 52 POL'Y RES. Q. 767, 767-783 (1999); Joel L. Fleishman & Arthur H. Aufses,
Law and Orders: The Problem of Presidential Legislation, 40 Laws and Contemporary
Problems 1, 1-45 (1976); W. Andrew Jack, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498:
Usurpation of Legislative Power or Blueprint for Legislative Reform?, 54 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 512, 512-40 (1985); George A. Krause & David B. Cohen, Presidential Use of
Executive Orders, 1953-1994, 25 AM. POL. Q. 458, 458-71 (1997); Kenneth R. Mayer,
Executive Orders and Presidential Power, 6 J. OF POLITICS. 445, 445-66 (1999); Terry
M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 132, 132-79 (1999); William D. Neighbors, Presidential Legislation by
Executive Order, 37 U. COLO. L. REV. 105, 105-18 (1964); Morton Rosenberg, Beyond
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II. OVERT VS. UNCONSCIOUS AND SUBTLE DISCRIMINATION
As we enter the early part of the twenty-first century, it is fair to say that
generally blatant forms of race-based discrimination are not condoned either
by statute or by "fair-minded people." 8 One of the primary purposes of Title
VII was to define what constituted unlawful race-based discrimination, as
well as to establish the sanctions against employers, employment agencies,
and labor organizations that engage in such unlawful behavior. 9 Thus, it is
also fair to assert that Title VII, by force of law, was designed to change
behavior and possibly attitudes about the hiring and treatment of racial
minorities in the workplace. It is, however, subject to debate as to how well
the EEOC and the courts have performed in the actual effectuation of Title
VII, or what Professor Alfred Blumrosen calls "in the transmission of law."' 0
the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking under
Executive Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L. REV. 193, 193-247 (1981); PETER W. SPERLICH,
BARGAINING AND OVERLOAD: AN ESSAY ON PRESIDENTIAL POWER, IN THE PRESIDENCY
168 (Aaron Wildavsky ed., 1969); Margaret Weir, Ideas and Politics: The Acceptance of
Keynesianism in Britain and the United States, in The Political Power of Economic Ideas:
Keynesianism Across Nations 53 (Peter A. Hall ed., 1989); Robert B. Cash, Note,
Presidential Power: Use and Enforcement of Executive Orders, 39 NOTRE DAME L. REV
44, (1963); Editorial, Government by Executive Order, Wash. Times, July 8, 1998, at
Al 8; Elizabeth Shogren, Clinton to Bypass Congress in Blitz of Executive Orders, L.A.
TIMES, July 4, 1998, http://articles.latimes.com/1998/jul/04/news/mn-608.
8 An examination of court decisions favorable to Title VII plaintiffs is evidence that
overt or blatant discrimination still occurs today. See, e.g., Bari-Ellen Roberts, Roberts
vs. Texaco: A True Story of Race and Corporate America (1998); see also Douglas A.
Blackmon & Nicole Harris, Racial Bind: Black Utility Workers in Georgia See Nooses As
Sign of Harassment, Wall St. J., April 2, 2001, at A-1, A-8; Correspondents of the New
York Times, How Race Is Lived In America: Pulling Together, Pulling Apart (2001);
BARACK OBAMA, DREAMS FROM MY FATHER: A STORY OF RACE AND INHERITANCE
(1995).
9 See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-07 (1979)
(discussing the legislative history of Title VII); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
429-30 (1971) ("The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII . . . was to
achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in
the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees.").
1 0 See ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW: THE LAW TRANSMISSION SYSTEM
AND EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY (1993) (pointing out that although Brown v.
Board of Education was decided in 1954, with the Supreme Court ordering integration of
the public schools "with all deliberate speed," to date the schools in Topeka remain
segregated and the enactment of laws and many court decisions are not important
(symbolic) unless they "effectuate change" or actually implement the policy or purpose
behind such public policies).
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Notwithstanding, as evidenced by the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v.
Board of Education," the enactment and enforcement of various civil rights
laws have brought about varying degrees of social change in our country.12
One should be mindful of this reality and not unwittingly dismiss or discount
the work of such early civil rights pioneers as Wiley Branton, Charles
Hamilton Houston, Thurgood Marshall, Dorothy Height, and John Lewis. 13
When the outside observers Alexis De Tocqueville and Gunnar Myrdal
visited this country during the early 19th and 20th centuries, respectively, the
forms or types of discrimination that they observed were manifestations of a
consciously and de jure racially segregated society.14 A society in which
overt forms of both race and gender-based discrimination was commonplace
and, in fact, often existed by law.'15
Indeed, many individuals today can recall when the concepts and
practices of "female jobs" and "male jobs"l6 and "Negro jobs" and "white
jobs"17 were the order of the day. Many also remember when there were no
11 Brown v. Board. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
1 2 See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
13 See generally JUAN WILLIAMS, MY SOUL LOOKS BACK IN WONDER: VOICES OF
THE CIVIL RIGHTS EXPERIENCE (2004).
14 See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Richard D.
Heffner ed., 1956); GUNNAR MYRDAL, I AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM
AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (1962) [hereinafter Myrdal Vol. 1]; 2 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN
AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (1962)
[hereinafter Myrdal Vol. 2]; ARNOLD ROSE, THE NEGRO IN AMERICA: THE CONDENSED
VERSION OF GUNNAR MYRDAL'S AN AMERICAN DILEMMA # (1964); LEO KANOWITZ,
WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION (1969); JUDITH A. BAER, THE
CHAINS OF PROTECTION: THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO WOMEN'S LABOR LEGISLATION
(1978).
15 Id.
16 See Muller v. State of Or., 208 U.S. 412, 422-23 (1908) (upholding the
constitutionality of state labor protective laws which effectively discriminated against
women as a class and is often viewed as creating a "major barrier" to women's rights in
the workplace and permitted the perpetuation of "male jobs" and "female jobs").
17 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 405-06 (1856) (having a similar effect
to that of Muller v. State of Oregon only in permitting "white jobs" and "Negro jobs");
see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 563-64 (1896). For a more extensive reading
in this area, see WILLIAM B. GOULD, BLACK WORKERS IN WHITE UNIONS: JOB
DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1977). See also HERBERT HILL, BLACK LABOR
AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: I. RACE, WORK AND THE LAW (1977); Myrdal Vol. 1,
supra note 14, at 281; Myrdal Vol. 2, supra note 14, at 287; Rose, supra note 14, at 102;
Derrick Bell, Slavery and American Law, in RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (6th
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federal statutes in existence to prohibit age and disability-based
discrimination, much less public policy prohibiting discrimination against
sexual orientation or genetic-based discrimination.' 8
In retrospect, as a civilized society, this country has come a long way on
the heels of a number of national public policies and laws that compel the
inclusion and integration in the workplace of many formerly excluded
members of various demographic groups. We should be ever mindful that
these changes-particularly integration-came about due to the compulsion
of the law and court decisions, and were not due to the voluntary behavior or
"interest convergence"' 9 of employers and labor organizations.
Notwithstanding these advances brought about by workplace civil rights
laws, incidents of sexual and racial harassment and discrimination continue
today.20 Thus, in many ways, private internal conflict management systems
and ADR processes may also serve as effective tools and mechanisms to
further effectuate U.S. civil rights laws and to better manage a diverse
workforce. The role of the law and the courts in integrating our society and
the workplace is a reality that might not be fully appreciated today.
However, the challenge facing our society in the twenty-first century is
not solely identifying and eliminating the blatant or overt forms of
ed., 2008); Arthur Ross, The Negro in the American Economy, in Employment, Race and
Poverty (Arthur Ross & Herbert Hill eds., 1967). See generally Employment, Race and
Poverty (Arthur M. Ross & Herbert Hill eds., 1967); The Negro and the American Labor
Movement (Julius Jacobson ed., 1968).
18 See Kathleen Zeitz, Employer Genetic Testing: A Legitimate Screening Device or
Another Method of Discrimination?, 42 LAB. L. J. 230 (1991); Edith F. Canter,
Employment Discrimination Implications of Genetic Screening in the Workplace Under
Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act, 10 AM J.L. & MED. 323 (1984). See also Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (endorsing the theory of disproportionate
effect or disparate impact). See generally Karen Moulding, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
THE LAW (Roberta Achtenberg ed., 2008) (Arguably, genetic testing could have a
disparate impact on racial and ethnic minorities).
19 See Derek A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 528-534 (1979) (discussing various
interest-convergence remedies in Brown).
20 See Gregory S. Parks & Quinetta M. Roberson, Michelle Obama: A
Contemporary Analysis of Race and Gender Discrimination Through the Lens of Title
VII, 20 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 3, 19 (2008) ("Undeniably, Americans have made
tremendous progress with regards to attitudes about race and gender in the past several
decades. This progress, however, has occurred primarily at a surface level within society.
Research on implicit attitudes, which are judgments that are automatically activated
without a person's awareness or intention, suggests that negative, stereotypical attitudes
about Blacks and women are still pervasive.").
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discrimination observed by Alexis de Tocqueville and Gunnar Myrdal. 21
Rather, the real challenge facing our society is how to deal effectively,
equitably, and fairly with two other forms of discrimination: "unconscious
discrimination" and "subtle discrimination." Harvard Professor and
psychiatrist Chester Pierce was one of the first scholars and observers to
recognize the phenomenon of unconscious discrimination and its damaging
cumulative effect on individual victims.22 Professor Pierce referred to these
forms of discrimination as "micro-aggressions." 23 MIT Professor and
ombudsperson Mary P. Rowe, building upon Professor Pierce's theory of
"micro-aggression," subsequently coined the terms "micro-inequities" and
"subtle discrimination." 24
Continued incidents of hate crimes, police profiling, and other
documented acts of overt discrimination in the workplace belie the notion
that overt and blatant discrimination has ceased to exist in our society today.
However, instances of unconscious and subtle discrimination often serve as
the basis for many, if not most, contemporary claims of workplace
discrimination.25 Because these forms of discrimination are very difficult to
prove, claims stemming from unconscious and subtle discrimination are,
while actionable in fact, arguably not actionable in practice under our various
federal and state anti-discrimination laws. 26 Consequently, ADR processes
should, as a matter of public policy, be used as effective tools to resolve
these claims of unconscious and subtle employment discrimination at the
earliest practicable stages of a dispute. These processes may also be effective
tools in inhibiting employment decisions unconsciously based on
stereotypes.27
21 See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 14; Myrdal Vol. 1, supra note 14.
22 See, e.g., Chester Pierce, Offensive Mechanisms, in THE BLACK SEVENTIES 265, #
(Floyd B. Barbour ed., 1970).
23 See id. at 266, 271, 280.
24 Mary P. Rowe, Barriers to Equality: The Power of Subtle Discrimination to
Maintain Unequal Opportunity, 3 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS & RESPONSIBILITIES J. 153, 155
(1990) [hereinafter Barriers to Equality].2 5 Id. at 158-59.
2 6 Id. at 162.
27 See, e.g., Donald B. Reder, Mediation as a Settlement Tool for Employment
Disputes, 43 LAB. L.J. 602 (1992); See also Robert A. Baruch Bush, "What Do We Need
a Mediator For? ": Mediation's "Value-Added"for Negotiators, 12 Ohio St. J. on Disp.
Resol. 1, 14-15 (1996).
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A. Research on Covert and Modern Discrimination
The book Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism28 describes
experiments examining the "causes and consequences of contemporary forms
of prejudice, discrimination, and racism." 29 According to John F. Dovidio
and Samuel L. Gaertner, although the percentage of whites with overt racist
prejudices against blacks dropped dramatically between 1933 and 1988,
"even whites who consider themselves to be liberal and egalitarian on race
issues harbor unconscious racist attitudes and behave in racist fashion toward
blacks." 30 They often are unaware that their responses are race-based.3 1
"[T]his form of racism, identified as 'aversive racism,' results from whites'
assimilation of an egalitarian value system with 'impressions derived from
human cognitive mechanisms that contribute to the development of
stereotypes and prejudice, and . .. feelings and beliefs derived from historical
and contemporary cultural racist contexts.' "32
In another study, Dovidio and Gaertner found that there was a difference
between whites' conscious and unconscious attitudes:
Even unconsciously, positive characteristics were associated more with
whites than with blacks. For the negative traits, however, there was a
discrepancy between unconscious and conscious responding. Specifically,
negative characteristics were responded to significantly faster following a
black prime than following a white prime. Thus, even though at a conscious
level whites reject negative attributions of blacks, at an unconscious level
they do have negative associations. This study therefore provides direct
support for our assumption that people who consciously and genuinely
embrace egalitarian ideals may, out of their awareness, still harbor negative
feelings toward blacks.33
28 JOHN F. DovIDIo & SAMUEL L. GAERTNER, PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND
RACISM (1986).
29 Id at 18.
30 Ann C. McGinley, !Viva La Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title
VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 415, 426 (1999) [hereinafter !Viva La Evolucion!].
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 427. See also John F. Dividio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Changes in the
Expression and Assessment of Racial Prejudice, in OPENING DOORS: PERSPECTIVES ON
RACE RELATIONS IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 119, 138 (Harry J. Knopke, Robert J.
Norrell & Ronald W. Rodgers eds., 1991).
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According to Professor Ann C. McGinley, the research of Professors
Dovidio and Gaertner:
strongly suggests that whites act on these unconscious negative feelings
when they are able to justify their actions. For example, in one experiment
Dovidio and Gaertner created an "emergency" situation in which black and
white victims asked white bystanders for help. They found that whites
normally helped black victims slightly more than white victims if there was
no one else present to help. Whites' helping behavior toward black victims
dropped dramatically, however, in situations where another potential helper
was present. Where others were present, whites helped black victims only
about half as often as white victims . . . where there were no others present,
whites could generally not refuse to help blacks without damaging their
egalitarian self-image because there was no non-discriminatory reason for
the failure to help.
Similar results occurred in tests conducted by Professors Katz,
Wackenhutt and Glass. Their experiments demonstrated that white subjects
reacted more strongly toward blacks than toward whites depending on the
situation. For example, Katz instructed white male college students to give
electric shocks for errors made by white or black students working at
learning a task. White students who administered the shocks could choose
between administering a mild or a severe shock. While explaining their
reasons for selecting the more severe shock, white students described the
black students receiving the severe shock in a much more derogatory
fashion than they rated their white counterparts. 34
There is not a universal school of thought explaining the nature of
prejudice or for that matter unconscious discrimination. This phenomenon
might explain the disparity with which black workers view their general and
anticipated treatment in the workplace, and might also serve as the basis for
many, if not most, complaints of discrimination.
Those who are interested and committed to promoting the early
resolution of claims based on discrimination-unconscious or conscious-
ought to agree at this point that it is important to understand the concept and
phenomenon of unconscious discrimination and how it works. Such an
understanding might serve to prevent the filing of a number of EEO claims
and better inform supervisors and managers, human resources professionals,
employment lawyers, and even mediators and arbitrators of their unconscious
biases. An understanding of unconscious and subtle discrimination may also
34 !Viva La Evolucion!, supra note 30, at 427-28.
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serve to better effectuate the purpose of Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of
1991.
B. Unconscious Discrimination
Unconscious discrimination has been the focus of considerable scientific
research. 35 The existence of this phenomenon is generally not known by
most people and thus not appreciated by the majority of individuals,
including human resources professionals, employment lawyers, and
mediators. However, the effects of unconscious discrimination are very well
known by racial minorities and in many instances women.
As is the case with subtle discrimination, the often profound
consequences of unconscious discrimination are just as damaging to the
victim as are the consequences of overt discrimination. In fact, the argument
can be made that because unconscious and subtle discrimination are by
definition often unintentional, it is worse than overt discrimination which is
definitively actionable. A victim of unconscious and/or subtle discrimination
often has very little, if any, redress except where employers have
implemented internal conflict management systems to deal with claims of
unfairness and general harassment.
There is a considerable amount of scientific research and a number of
studies related to the nature of prejudice and, specifically, unconscious
discrimination. One of the most informed articles about unconscious
discrimination was authored by Professor Ann C. McGinley in "!Viva a
Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII."36 In this article,
35 See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald, Debbie E. McGhee & Jordan L.K. Schwartz,
Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74
J. PERSONALITY AND Soc. PSYCHOL. 1464 (1998) (presenting research designed to
evaluate "the IAT method's usefulness for measuring evaluative associations that
underlie implicit attitudes").
36 See Lamont E. Stallworth et al., Discrimination in the Workplace: How Mediation
Can Help, 56 DisP. RESOL. J. 35, 37-43 (2001) (arguing that "C" charges should be
mediated rather than just dismissed because they could involve unconscious
discrimination); see Michael J. Yelnosky, Title VII, Mediation, and Collective Action,
1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 583, 589-92 (noting that the litigation process is an unrealistic
option for plaintiffs). See generally !Viva La Evolucion!, supra note 30; see also Ann C.
McGinley, The Emerging Cronyism Defense and Affirmative Action: A Critical
Perspective on the Distinction Between Colorblind and Race-Conscious Decision Making
Under Title VII, 39 ARIz. L. REv. 1003, 1009 (1997) (discussing "A new conceptual
framework for approaching the question of race-based and race-neutral decision
making,") [hereinafter Emerging Cronyism]; Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego,
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Professor McGinley describes the phenomenon of unconscious
discrimination:
Persons whose acts result from bias and prejudice are often unaware of their
subconscious motivations. Thus, it is likely that differential treatment of a
female or minority employee in the workplace is because of his race or her
gender, even though the employer is unaware that race and gender
motivated the differential treatment. A[n] [evidentiary] rule limiting the
definition of discrimination to cases where the employer consciously treated
an employee differently because of membership in a protected class ignores
the social science evidence [related to unconscious discrimination] and
narrows the effectiveness of the statute [i.e., Title VII.
[T]he proof mechanisms serve the role of determining causation rather than
conscious intent, assuring that the underlying employment decision is made
because of the employee's protected characteristic, either with or without
the employer's conscious awareness. 37
According to Professor McGinley, this created a "dislocation between
theoretical justifications for the proof mechanisms designed to identify
conscious discriminatory intent and the reality that these mechanisms could
also identify unconscious discrimination." 38 Professor McGinley criticizes
and refers to this dislocation as a "counter evolution," "resulting in a
conservative shift in proof and evidentiary standards." 39 In short, the
"counter evolution" theory is "based on a concept of discrimination narrowly
limited to consciously discriminatory acts." 40
Thus, the tension created between the admissibility and consideration of
social science evidence related to unconscious discrimination and traditional
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 329-
30 (1986) (describing how discrimination laws- fail to deal with the realities of
unconscious racism); Jessie Allen, Note, A Possible Remedy for Unthinking
Discrimination, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 1299, 1299-1304 (1995) (asserting that the failure of
civil rights laws is related to the reluctance to expand the definition of discrimination to
include an objective standard that would address unconscious use of stereotypes).
37 !Viva La Evolucion!, supra note 30, at 418-19.
38 Id. at 419.
39 Id.
40 Id.
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legal evidentiary standards is often at the "unspoken heart" of many EEO
disputes and invariably influences settlement decisions.41
Professors C. Neil Macrae, Galen Bodenhausen, and Alan B. Milne
believe that one role a workplace neutral can play is to assist the
decisionmaker in becoming aware of his or her biases. 42 Whether
unconscious or subtle, studies have found that the "heightened self-focus" of
an evaluator (i.e., the alleged perpetrator) whose personal standards conflict
with negative cultural stereotypes will permit the evaluator to inhibit the
activation of the stereotype and to make decisions based on his or her more
egalitarian personal standards. 43
Professors Macrae, Bodenhausen, and Milne conclude that a "heightened
self-focus" increased the efficiency of the perceiver to regulate cognitive
processing. 44 In lay terms, if the potential unconscious discriminator can be
made aware of the tensions between his or her personal egalitarian standards
and negative stereotypes, this will enhance the probability that his or her
decisionmaking, e.g., promotion or discharge decisions, will not be
unconsciously motivated.
C. Subtle Discrimination
Professor Mary P. Rowe, in her article entitled "Barriers to Equality:
The Power of Subtle Discrimination To Maintain Unequal Opportunity,"45
has described subtle discrimination as follows:
41 See Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2555 (2011) (discussing statistical
analyses used to bolster support for a gender discrimination class action lawsuit).
42 See C. Neil Macrae et al., Saying No To Unwanted Thoughts: Self-Focus and the
Regulation of Mental Life, 74 J. PERS. Soc. PSYCHOL. 578 (1998); See also C. Neil
Macrae et al., The Dissection of Selection in Person Perception: Inhibitory Processes in
Social Stereotyping,. 69 J. PERS. Soc. PSYCHOL. 397 (1995).
43 See generally Ann C. McGinley, "Viva La Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious
Motive in Title VII," 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 415. See also John F. Dovidio, et al.,
"On the Nature of Prejudice: Automatic and Controlled Processes: F. 33 EXPERIMENTAL
Soc. PSYCHOL. 510, 534 (1997).
44 See John F. Dovidio and Samuel L. Gaerter, Prejudice, Discrimination and
Racism: Historical Trends and Contemporary Approaches, in PREJUDICE,
DISCRIMINATION AND RACISM (Dovidio & Gaertner, eds. 1986). See also John F. Dovidio
and Samuel L. Gaertner, Changes In The Expression and Assessment ofRacial Prejudice
In Opening Doors, PERSPECTIVE ON RACE RELATIONS IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA,
(Harry Knopke; Robert I. Norell and Ronald W. Rogers, eds. 1991).
45 Barriers to Equality, supra note 24, at 153-63.
183
THE OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
[S]ubtle discrimination is now the principal scaffolding for segregation in
the United States. . . . This scaffolding is built of "micro-inequities"
apparently small events, often ephemeral and hard-to-prove events, which
are covert, often unintentional, frequently unrecognized by the perpetrator.
Micro-inequities occur wherever people are perceived to be "different,"
Caucasians in a Japanese-owned company, African-Americans in a white
firm, women in a traditionally male environment, Jews and Moslems in a
traditional Protestant environment. These mechanisms of prejudice against
persons of difference are usually small in nature, but not trivial in effect.
They are especially powerful taken together. (As one drop of water has little
effect, though continuous drops may be destructive, one racist slight may be
insignificant, but many such slights cause serious damage.) Micro-
inequities work both by, excluding the person of difference and by making
that person less self-confident and less productive. 46
Professor Rowe further suggests "an employer may prevent such damage by
developing programs on diversity, such as 'valuing differences' and team
building."47
In addition to the worthwhile suggestions of Professor Rowe, the
establishment and implementation of internal conflict management systems,
with optional access to an external corps of professional mediators, fact-
finders, and other workplace dispute resolvers, would be an effective tool for
the early resolution of these types of disputes. This point represents the
overarching thesis of this article.
Many of the cases involving claims of discrimination, particularly those
arising under Title VII, employ some variant of the evidentiary framework,
initially set forth in McDonnell-Douglas,48 for establishing claims of
discrimination when there is no direct evidence of discrimination.49 Under
this framework, the plaintiff must initially establish a prima facie case.50 The
elements of this prima facie case will vary somewhat depending upon the
type of discrimination alleged.5 1 If the plaintiff is successful in doing this, the
burden shifts to the defendant to come forward with some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its challenged action.52 Successfully proffering
46 Id. at 153.
47 Id.
48 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
49 Id.
50 Id. at 802.
51 Id.
52 Id
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this reason will generally be sufficient to rebut the plaintiffs prima facie
case.53 The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the reason(s)
advanced by the defendant for its action is pre-textual, i.e., is not the true
reason for its action, and that the defendant intended to act in a
discriminatory manner. 54 Issues of subtle discrimination typically arise when
the plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer's proffered reasons for its
actions are only a pretext for discrimination. 55
In determining whether or not to submit a matter to mediation or early
settlement negotiations, the issue of whether a claim involves subtle
discrimination versus overt or blatant disparate treatment is a critical factor.
Professor Michael Selmi argues that, although the Supreme Court has
explicitly recognized that discrimination has become more subtle and
therefore more difficult to prove and has acknowledged the fact that subtle
discrimination is no more permissible than overt or blatant discrimination,
subtle discrimination is clearly actionable, at least in theory.56 According to
Selmi, the Supreme Court has affirmed this on many occasions.57
In addition to the traditional forms of discrimination, the existence of
''unconscious" or "subtle" discrimination is even more prevalent today and
serves as the basis of many informal and formal claims of employment
discrimination, as suggested by Rowe and other scholars.58 These types of
discrimination may be unintended, unconsciously perpetrated, and arguably
not actionable under the applicable anti-discrimination laws. As asserted
earlier, the economic and psychological impact and consequences of such
unconscious and/or subtle acts of discrimination are just as pernicious and
damaging to the victim of such acts as to the individual who is a victim of
intentional and more easily provable discrimination. It is not suggested here
that these "unconscious" or "subtle" forms of discrimination should be
cognizable under the law. However, when people speak in terms of our
"litigious society," but do not inquire as to why workers file claims, it is
often unconscious and subtle discrimination that forms the basis for such
litigation. 59
53 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 803.
54 Id. at 804.
55 Id.
56 See Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme
Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 284 (1997).
57 See generally Id.
58 See ROWE, supra note 24, at 154.
59 1d. at 159.
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Human resources professionals, managers, and employment attorneys
can better understand the nature and profound anger of racial minorities and
female complainants if they are also made aware of the lifelong experience
of being subject to unconscious and subtle discrimination. In many instances,
the basis of a claim of discrimination is equally based on the complainant's
broader and historical social experience of being the subject of unconscious
and subtle discrimination, as well as the immediate controversy at hand.60
Employing the early implementation and use of internal conflict
management systems can effectively resolve these types of disputes, perhaps
without the individual losing his or her job. This would be to the economic
benefit of both the employer, the employee, and to society as a whole-
particularly given the realities of the changing demographics of the
workplace. Many more employment relations would be preserved with the
early use of mediation, if it were made an option. Whether disparate
treatment manifests itself in a subtle or overt form is ultimately irrelevant for
purposes of liability.61
According to Professor Selmi, lower courts have also explicitly
acknowledged the importance of recognizing subtle discrimination.62 In Lynn
v. Regents of University of California,63 a sex discrimination case, the court
noted:
The beliefs that women should not have the right to vote, practice law, or
serve on the United States Supreme Court, were once reflective of the
majority view, and the law. We now understand, somewhat belatedly, that
these concepts reflect a discriminatory attitude. Today any person is free to
hold to such concepts, but such concepts may not serve as the basis for job-
related decisions in employment covered by Title VII. Other concepts
reflect a discriminatory attitude more subtly; the subtlety does not, however,
make the impact less significant or less unlawful. It serves only to make the
courts' task of scrutinizing attitudes and motivation, in order to determine
the true reason for employment decisions, more exacting. . . . We are saying
only what Title VII commands: when plaintiffs establish that decisions
60 Id. at 158-59.
61 Selmi, supra note 56, at 312.
62 Id. at 338.
63 Lynn v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337, 1343 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981); See
also McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 801-02 (1973) (observing that "[t]he broad,
overriding interest, shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient and
trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and racially neutral employment and
personnel decisions. In the implementation of such decisions, it is abundantly clear that
Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise.") (emphasis added).
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regarding academic employment are motivated by discriminatory attitudes
relating to race or sex, or are rooted in concepts which reflect such
discriminatory attitudes, however subtly, courts are obligated to afford the
relief provided by Title VII. 64
Based upon the foregoing, it is reasonable to conclude that claims stemming
from "subtle discrimination" are actionable-at least in theory.65
III. SOME FACTUAL REALITIES OF ENFORCEMENT OF STATUTORY
DISCRIMINATION LAWS
Given the importance of work as expressed by Sigmund Freud and
William Shakespeare, among others,66 it is not surprising that such
workplace civil rights enforcement agencies as the EEOC67 and the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) come under considerable criticism on a
regular basis. 68 Indeed, when the EEOC was first established, it was referred
to as a "paper tiger."69
64 Lynn, 656 F.2d at 1343 n.5.
65 See generally Selmi, supra note 56.
66 Rothstein et al., supra note 1, at 21.
67 See E. Patrick McDermott et al, An Evaluation of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission Mediation Program, THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (Sept. 20, 2000),
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/mediation/report/chapter4.html (reviewing the EEOC's charge
processing cycles over the last twenty years, starting in May 1977 with the reign of
Chairwoman Eleanor Holmes Norton and ending in 2000 under the leadership of
chairwoman Ida Castro and indicating that virtually every enforcement initiative has been
hindered by a lack of funds, increasing responsibilities and overriding criticism that the
charge-processing backlog has become unmanageable).
68 See, e.g., JAMES A. GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE: THE SUBVERSION OF U.S. LABOR
RELATIONS POLICY, 1947-1994 (1995); WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, LABORED RELATIONS:
LAW, POLITICS AND THE NLRB-A MEMOIR (2000).
69 McDermott, supra note 67, (noting that the issue of funding also affects the
EEOC's mediation program). See Race Discrimination: Report to U.N Panel Lauds
Recent Changes at EEOC for Improved Attacks on Race Bias, 185 DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) A-8 (Sept. 22, 2000) (applauding the efforts of the EEOC in reducing its backlog,
hiring new employees and improving technology while also pointing to the fact that
"[i]nadequate enforcement of existing anti-discrimination laws due to underfunding of
federal and state civil rights agencies is among a host of reasons cited for the 'subtle
forms of discrimination against minority individuals and groups' that exist in American
society."); Fawn Johnson, Congress: In Parting, Goodling Urges Regulatory Caution,
Amending Outdated Labor Laws, 248 DAILY LAB, REP. (BNA) C-1 (Dec. 27, 2000)
187
THE OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
While the staffs of such enforcement agencies are generally committed to
carrying out the mission of these agencies, the ever-changing political
philosophies of Presidential administrations and budget constraints often
hinder agencies in fulfilling their missions.70 Several other realities related to
the enforcement and litigation of Title VII claims come into play. The first is
that many of the charging parties have a very difficult time retaining legal
representation. 71 This is the case even in the face of the provisions for
awarding attorney fees under the Civil Rights Act of 199 1.72 The difficulty in
(mentioning Republican attempts to prevent the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration); Julie Harders, Too Good to Last? Budget Cuts Force the EEOC to
Terminate Contract Mediators From its New, Highly Touted Program, A.B.A. J., at 30
(Apr. 2000). See also Fawn Johnson, EEOC: Castro Says FY 2000 Budget Means Loss
of Mediation Program's External Contractors, 38 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-10 (Feb.
25, 2000) [hereinafter Johnson, EEOC: Castro] (discussing that $800 per mediation by
private mediators would not be funded in 2000 as the EEOC reached out to organizations
to provide pro bono mediation services); Fawn Johnson, EEOC: House Subcommittee
Approves Increase of $10 Million in EEOC's FY 2001 Budget, 111 DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) A-10 (Jun. 8, 2000) [hereinafter Johnson, EEOC's FY 2001 Budget]. See
generally Michael Z. Green, Proposing A New Paradigm for EEOC Enforcement After
35 Years: Outsourcing Charge Processing By Mandatory Mediation, 105 DICK. L. REV.
305, 312 n.14, 323 n.51-52, 325, n.59 (2001) (summarizing the history and political
compromises behind the passage of Title VII and reporting on the many individuals
referring to the EEOC as a "paper tiger," or "toothless tiger") [hereinafter Enforcement
After 35 Years]; Alfred Blumrosen, Black Employment and the Law (1971); The 1970's:
The "Toothless Tiger" Gets Its Teeth - A New Era of Enforcement, U.S. EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/1970s/index.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2011).
70 McDermott, supra note 67; Harders, supra note 69, at 30; Johnson, EEOC:
Castro, supra note 69, at A-10; Johnson, EEOC's FY 2001 Budget, supra note 71, at A-
10 ; Race Discrimination: Report to U.N. Panel Lands Lauds Recent Changes at EEOC
for Improved Attacks on Race Bias, supra note 69. See generally Michael Z. Green,
Proposing A New Paradigm For EEOC Enforcement After 35 Years: Outsourcing
Charge Processing By Mandatory Mediation, 10 DICKINSON L. REV. 305 (2000-2001).
71 See, e.g., Lewis Maltby, Paradise Lost-How the Gilmer Court Lost the
Opportunity For Alternative Dispute Resolution to Improve Civil Rights, 12 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. HuM. RTs. 1, 3 (1994); See also Lamont E. Stallworth, Behind the Eight Ball: The
Unrepresented Claimant and Employment Dispute Resolution, ACREsOLuTION, Spring
2002, at 26-29 [hereinafter Behind the Eight Ball] (suggesting that trained non-attorneys
can provide either representation or technical assistance, at least in the mediation process
and the issue of attorney representation and the imbalance of power have also been
addressed by a number of other scholars).
72 See BERNARD D. REAMS, JR. AND FAYE COUTURE (EDITORS) LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE 1991 ACT PUBLIC LAW 102-166 WHICH AMENDED THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF
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obtaining legal representation deters individuals from seeking redress under
Title VII, and many members of economically disadvantaged groups are
directly affected by this reality. 73
Second, the EEOC has been chronically underfunded and understaffed. 74
This results in investigations often taking an inordinate amount of time to
complete and provides an example of the phrase, "Justice delayed is justice
denied." The delay psychologically and economically affects the charging
party or plaintiff and his or her family, which in turn affects the thoroughness
and quality of EEOC investigations. 75 Consequently, as Professor Michael
Green argues, the EEOC has become more of a case handling or processing
agency as opposed to an actual enforcement agency. 76
1964 (Seven Volumes including 1B3 Documents) (For the legislative history of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 and explaining that The Civil Rights Act of 1991 attempted to address
the issue of attorney representation by providing for payment of attorney fees where a
plaintiff prevails under the Act in cases involving disparate treatment).
73 See, e.g., Sandra Gleason, The Probability of Redress: Seeking External Support,
in BARBARA L. FORISHA & BARBARA H. GOLDMAN, OUTSIDERS ON THE INSIDE: WOMEN
& ORGANIZATIONS 171 (1981). See Generally D.M. SAUNDERS, B.H. SHEPPARD & V.
KNIGHT, WHEN Do EMPLOYEES SPEAK UP?: FACTORS INFLUENCING THE PROPENSITY To
USE VOICE (Nat'l Inst. of Disp. Resol. ed., 1987); Gail Schmoller Philbin, Silent
Majority: Before Laws Made It Illegal, Sexual Harassment Was Often Swept Under the
Rug, Chi. Trib., Feb. 24, 2004, at Cl; Sana Siwolop Management: Recourse or
Retribution?; Employers Are Taking On Disgruntled Workers in Court, N.Y. TIMES, June
7, 2000, at Cl (asserting that increasingly defendant employers have treated charging
parties and plaintiffs harshly in the process of mounting their defense); PAUL M.
BARRETT, THE GOOD BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF RACE IN AMERICA (1999).
74 See, e.g., U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
SERVING THE NATION FOR 45 YEARS: FY 2012 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
JUSTIFICATION 1 (2011) ("An increasing number of job seekers and workers across
the country have turned to the EEOC for assistance with discrimination complaints in the
first decade of the 21st century, yet funding and staffing declined significantly during
much of that period. Between 2000 and 2008, the EEOC's staffing level dropped by
nearly 30%. At the same time, as its jurisdiction expanded, the number of discrimination
charges filed with the EEOC reached historic levels, peaking between 2008 and 2010.
The convergence of these factors yielded a growing backlog of unresolved discrimination
charges.").
75 See, e.g., Peter T. Kilbom, A Family Spirals Downward in Waiting for Agency to
Act, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1995, at Al.
76 See, e.g., Green, supra note 69, at 305-56 (criticizing the EEOC as being more of
a case processing entity as opposed to an enforcement agency); See also Janice R.
Franke, Does Title VII Contemplate Personal Liability for Employee/Agent Defendants?,
12 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 39, 40-41(1994) (noting that "[o]ne pitfall of the compromise
frenzy [leading up to Title VII's passage] was that the remedial section of the statute,
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The third reality is that, notwithstanding the public policy encouraging
the use of ADR, only a limited number of employers have actually adopted
and implemented legitimate or credible internal conflict management
systems.77  Employers who have implemented integrated conflict
management systems (ICMS) have likely done so primarily as a result of the
filing of an EEOC charge or lawsuit that resulted in considerable damages
and bad publicity.
In the absence of early access to effective internal conflict management
systems, a complaining worker essentially has three alternatives: (1) remain
silent and accept the situation giving rise to the conflict; (2) remain in the
organization, but "exercise voice" by engaging in, for example, such counter
originally written to provide for judicial relief incidental to central agency enforcement,
was adopted without further conference or significant debate."); James E. Jones, Jr.,
Some Reflections on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 at Twenty, 36 Mercer L.
Rev. 813, 820-21 (1984) (describing Senate action to remove prosecutorial authority
from Title VII bill); Nancy Montwieler, Commission's Case Inventory Keeps Dropping,
But Monetary Benefits Were Lower Last Year, 6 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) C-1 (Jan. 9,
2001); Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of Title VII's Regulatory Regime: Rights, Theories,
and Realities, 46 ALA. L. REv. 375, 472-74 (1995) (asserting that Title VII has had a
positive impact on the economic conditions of African-Americans, as a whole and
contributing to more in the middle class); Major Impact of Title VII is Cited as Seminar
Marks 30- Year Anniversary, 122 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) D-24 (June 28, 1994); Maurice
E.R. Munroe, The EEOC: Pattern and Practice Imperfect, 13 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
219, 219 (1995) (stating that "race discrimination in employment remains pervasive
despite three decades of government effort" and asserting that the EEOC has been
"constrained to focus on processing individual charges of discrimination" rather than
being able to "concentrate on combating broader unlawful practices"); EEOC: New
Charge-Processing System Means More Action at Local Level, Official Says, 92 DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) D-9 (May 12, 1995); Nancy Montwieler, EEOC Reduces Pending
Inventory By Half-to 58,000 Cases-in Three Years, 157 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-1
(Aug. 14, 1998); EEOC Statistics on Charge Receipts and Resolutions, 157 DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA) E-6 (Aug. 14, 1998); Marjorie A. Silver, The Uses and Abuses of Informal
Procedures in Federal Civil Rights Enforcement, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 482, 542-44
(1987) (discussing the "rapid charge processing" program of Chairwoman Norton, the
critical GAO report and the response of Chairman Thomas).
77 DAVID B. LIPSKY ET AL., EMERGING SYSTEMS FOR MANAGING WORKPLACE
CONFLICT: LESSONS FROM AMERICAN COMPANIES FOR MANAGERS AND DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PROFESSIONALS 11 (2003) [hereafter Lipsky & Seeber, et.al.].
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workplace behavior as sabotage, absenteeism, and workplace violence;78 or
(3) exercise voice by filing an external EEOC charge or lawsuit.79
Common sense holds that, once an employee files a claim or lawsuit, he
or she often is no longer wanted by the employing organization. This
dynamic is manifest through EEOC and private mediation programs. It is the
general practice that as a condition for most "successfully" mediated
resolutions of EEO disputes, the charging party must agree to sever
employment, agree to never apply for future employment with that employer,
and waive and release any potential future related claims related to his or her
employment.
It is very doubtful that the drafters of Title VII intended the Act to
operate in this fashion. Among other things, this reality has a "chilling effect
on potential victims of discrimination."80 It also goes against the principle
recognizing "diversity being in the public interest," as pronounced by the
Grutter Court.81.In addition, these types of "buyout" settlements often do not
78 See Charlotte Rayner & Loraleigh Keashly, Bullying at Work: A Perspective from
Britain and North America, in COUNTERPRODUCTIVE WORK BEHAVIOR: INVESTIGATIONS
OF ACTORS AND TARGETS 271 (Suzy Fox & P.E. Spector eds., 2004).
79 Paul Steven Miller, A Just Alternative or Just an Alternative? Mediation and the
Americans With Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L. J. 11, 21 (2000) (reporting that an
independent study of the EEOC's found that 91% of the charging parties and 96% of the
responding parties would use mediation again and that only 31% of employers opted into
the EEOC's mediation program when offered, as compared to an 83% acceptance rate for
charging parties in fiscal year 2000).
80 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (holding that where
an employer has an employment practice or policy which appears to be "neutral" on its
face but when applied has disproportionate effect or disparate impact on protected class
that such a "neutral" practice or policy may constitute a violation of Title VII).
Consequently, where an employer has a general or neutral policy of refusing to pay
attorney fees, for example, unless there is a waiver and release as part of an EEOC
settlement that this policy or practice would most likely have a negative impact on racial
minorities and women, thus constituting a violation of Title VII. Similarly, where a
charging party remained employed but subsequently his or her performance evaluation
was effectively conducted by the law department would also constitute disparate
treatment in violation of Title VII.
81 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (holding that the use of race in
law school admissions was permitted and indicating that "diversity" is a matter of public
interest). Consequently, the author argues throughout this Article that the "file a charge or
lawsuit and lose your job" runs counter to this public interest and thus early access to
internal conflict management programs and ADR would appear to promote this "public"
interest of "diversity." Furthermore, at minimum federal contractors should be required to
have such internal programs.
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address the organizational or cultural basis for the dispute. Employers would
be more inclined to resolve most statutory-based disputes, including EEO
disputes, if there were attempts to resolve the matter early on internally and
privately versus filing a public claim externally at a later stage, which leads
to much higher costs.
It is partially the reality of this "file a charge/lose your job" dynamic that
prompts the advancement of NEDRA. This legislation would provide for the
early problem solving and resolution of such claims and would also serve as
an integral component in fulfilling the "unfinished work of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964."82
A final reality of the enforcement and litigation of claims under Title VII
is that even where plaintiffs prevail, the statistics suggest that there is a
greater probability that on appeal these verdicts favorable to plaintiffs have a
greater probability of being reversed than those of defendants. In a study
conducted by Cornell Law School Professors Theodore Eisenberg and
Stewart J. Schwab, researchers found that employment discrimination
plaintiffs did dramatically worse than defendants on appeal.83 Moreover, this
differential is greater in employment discrimination cases than in any other
category of civil cases. 84
82 Symposium, The Unfinished Work of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Shaping an
Agenda for the Next 40 Years, Howard University School of Law (2004).
83 Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 446-456 (2004).
84 See id. at 451-52; Susan Mandel, Equal Treatment? Study Shows a Wide Gap
Between Worker, Employer Wins in Job Bias Appeals, A.B.A. J. 24, 24 (Nov. 2001). But
see Harry T. Edwards & Linda Elliott, Beware of Numbers (and Unsupported Claims of
Judicial Bias), 80 WASH. U.L.Q. 723, 734 (2002) (claiming that Clermont and Eisenberg
made the mistake "of trying to extrapolate too much from limited data"); Kevin M.
Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights
Really Do Differ From Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 947 (2002). See
generally Kevin M. Clermont et al., How Employment Discrimination Plaintifs Fare in
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 547 (2003). Contra, Kevin
M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Judge Harry Edwards: A Case in Point!, 80 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1275 (2002) [hereinafter Harry Edwards] (criticizing the Edwards and Elliott
article and its assertions); Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So
Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REv. 555, 560-61 (2001) (asserting that employers prevail in
98% of federal court employment discrimination cases resolved and how these cases tend
to be resolved at the pre-trial stage).
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Although the findings of Professors Eisenberg and Schwab have been
questioned by a number of observers,85 they should not be ignored,
particularly given the deference which appeal courts should afford trial
courts' findings of fact. Specifically, in Albemarle Paper Company v.
Moody,86 the Supreme Court stated in relevant part "the courts of appeals
must maintain a consistent and principled application of the . . . statutory
objectives, while at the same time recognizing that the trial court will often
have the keener appreciation of those facts and circumstances peculiar to
particular cases."87
Setting aside differences on this issue, the Eisenberg-Schwab Report
undoubtedly provides a prism through which anyone who supports social and
workplace justice and workplace diversity should view the realities of
litigating Title VII claims. This scenario is further complicated when one
considers that the majority of Title VII claimants are unable to obtain legal
representation.88
85 See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards and Linda Elliott, Beware of Numbers and
Unsupported Claims of Judicial Bias, 80 WASH. U.L.Q. 723, 734 (2002) (claiming and
Clermont and Eisenberg made the mistake "of trying to extrapolate too much from
limited data").
86 Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
87 Id. at 421-22.
88 Maltby, supra note 71, at 3; see also Lamont E. Stallworth, Finding A Place For
Non-Lawyer Representation in Mediation, DIsP. RESOL. MAG. 19 (Winter 1997);. See
Stallworth, supra note 71 at 27-29. The issue of worker representation in mediation has
been the concern of a number of professional organizations. See SPIDR Panel Tackles
Issue of Unrepresented Claimant, INDIVIDUAL EMPL. RTs. (BNA) at 3 (Sept. 20, 1995).
In addition, at least one member of Congress has recognized the problem of worker
representation and proposed legislation to address it. See Employment Dispute
Resolution Act of 1994, S. 2327, 103d Cong. (1994); Danforth Introduces Mediation
Bill, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), July 29, 1994, at A-20; Arup Varma & Lamont E.
Stallworth, Participants' Satisfaction With EEO Mediation and the Issue of Legal
Representation: An Empirical Study Inquiry, 6 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 387, 387-418
(2002) (examining empirically the issue of legal representation); see Michael Z. Green,
Finding Lawyers For Employees in Discrimination Disputes As A Critical Prescription
For Unions To Embrace Racial Justice, 7 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 55, 55-118 (2004)
[hereinafter Finding Lawyers]. See generally, MICHELE HERMANN, ET AL., THE
METROCOURT PROJECT FINAL REPORT (1993); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative:
Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991) (expressing the idea that
mediation poses a substantial danger to unwilling female participants); Michele
Hermann, New Mexico Research Examines Impact of Gender and Ethnicity In Mediation,
DIsP. RESOL. MAG. 10 (Fall 1994); Gary LaFree & Christine Rack, The Effects of
Participants' Ethnicity and Gender on Monetary Outcomes in Mediated and Adjudicated
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Given these realities alone, workers who have early access to legitimate
internal conflict management systems would have a much more cost-
effective and humane way of providing workplace justice, which is one of
the overarching goals and objectives of NEDRA.
IV. AT A CROSSROADS: THE LEGAL AND PUBLIC POLICY CONTEXT OF
ADR IN THE WORKPLACE
Just as this country continuously struggles with the broader societal issue
of race relations, the field of ADR is also at a crossroads. This is not the first
time there has been a need to reflect upon how workplace disputes might be
more effectively resolved as a matter of public policy. Historically, law and
public policy have been used as the bases and vehicles to encourage the
private resolution of these disputes. 89 In this context, several ADR
issues/questions arise:
1. How to design and implement "legitimate" ICMS that (a) provide
both procedural and substantive due process; 90 (b) are timely and
financially affordable for all disputants; and (c) address the
potential "imbalance of power" which might exist between the
employer and individual worker91
2. How to identify, develop and ensure the utilization of a
demographically diverse corps of workplace neutrals
Civil Cases, 30 LAW & SoC'Y REv. 767 (1996); Amp Varma & Lamont E. Stallworth,
Participants' Satisfaction With EEO Mediation and the Issue of Legal Representation:
An Empirical Study Inquiry, 6 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 387, 387-418 (2002)
(examining empirically the issue of legal representation); Michael Z. Green, Finding
Lawyers For Employees in Discrimination Disputes As A Critical Prescription For
Unions To Embrace Racial Justice, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 55, 55-118 (2004)
[hereinafter Finding Lawyers].
89 See, e.g., PAUL R. HAYS, LABOR ARBITRATION: A DISSENTING VIEW 94 (1966)
(repudiating the precepts established in the Steelworkers' Trilogy); but see Saul Wallen,
Arbitrators and Judges: Dispelling the Hays Haze, CAL. MGMT. REv. 17, 17-24 (Spring
1967).
90 These processes must also be perceived as being fair, efficacious, and providing a
relatively "user friendly" form of workplace justice.
91 This potential "imbalance of power" might stem from one of the disputants being
more knowledgeable and sophisticated about relevant law and advocacy. Imbalance of
power might also stem from one disputant possessing substantially more financial
resources than the other disputant. Also related to the issue of imbalance of power is issue
of competent and/or legal representation.
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3. How to develop organizations that are both "diversity competent"
and "conflict-management competent," and are able to recognize
and sanction inappropriate and discriminatory behavior based on
unconscious and subtle discrimination
4. How to make ICMS available early in a controversy or dispute
5. Under what conditions should the EEOC, state EEO enforcement
agencies, and the courts defer to the outcomes flowing from both
interest based and rights based ADR processes?
6. Under what general conditions should the courts of appeals defer
to the findings of fact of the trial court, as suggested in the article
by Eisenberg and Schwab? 92
7. Whether participation in ADR processes should be mandatory
(with voluntary settlement outcomes) or strictly voluntary
Three other critical issues that must be addressed are (1) the costs related
to these ADR processes and the question of which disputant should generally
be responsible for bearing such costs; (2) the issue of competent legal
representation and whether trained non-attorneys should be permitted to
represent workers in such processes (e.g. a trained paralegal working under
the supervision of a licensed attorney); and (3) the assurance that racial
minority workplace neutrals shall actually be allowed and regularly used in
these ADR processes. The failure to do so would effectively create a "private
justice system" designed to effectuate our EEO laws, but which is ironically
de facto exclusionary and discriminatory.
A. Self-Regulation of the U.S. Workplace
The U.S. industrial relations system was founded, in part, on the premise
that there would be limited government involvement in labor and
management matters. 93 It was further envisioned that labor and management
would be able to self-regulate their interplay via the collective bargaining
process. 94 This was one of the thoughts behind the enactment of the Wagner
92 See supra note 83-84 and accompanying text.
93 See Lamont E. Stallworth, Government Regulation of Workplace Disputes and
Alternative Dispute Resolution, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIP_(Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997); See generally JOHN T. DUNLOP,
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEMS 370 (1958).
94 Id.
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Act and Taft-Hartley Act.95 Based upon this public policy premise, the
Supreme Court has consistently embraced the use of mediation and labor
arbitration as the preferred means of resolving industrial disputes. 96 This
principle was clearly set forth in a series of landmark decisions called the
Steelworkers' Trilogy.97 Although there were a number of observers who
questioned the basis of the Supreme Court's endorsement of labor arbitration
at this time,98 it is fair to state that from the 1960's up until 1974, the
primacy of labor arbitration was recognized as a private, voluntary, and final
and binding dispute resolution process. 99 There were, however, a limited
number of exceptions, such as a breach of the duty of fair representation
("DFR"). 0 Interestingly, a number of the DFR disputes involved the race-
based discriminatory handling of grievances.101
95 The National Labor Relations Act § 203D, 29 U.S.C.A. § 203(d), 29 U.S.C.A. §
151-169 (West 2011); 29 U.S.C.A. § 173(d) (West 2011):
Use of conciliation and mediation services as last resort. Final adjustment by a
method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method for
settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an
existing collective-bargaining agreement. The Service is directed to make its
conciliation and mediation services available in the settlement of such grievance
disputes only as a last resort and in exceptional cases.
96 See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960);
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 585
(1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
598-99 (1960).
97 See United Steelworkers of Am. V. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 567-68; United
Steelworkers of Am. V. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co, 363 U.S. at 585; United
Steelworkers of Am. V. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 598-99; See also
Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 458-59 (1957);
Boys Mkt, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 253-55 (1970); Collyer
Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 846 (1971).
98 See Wallen, supra note 89.
99 See infra note 116.
100 See Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., 393 U.S. 324, 328-331 (1969)
(holding that where a worker can show that it would be futile to seek remedy via an
internal grievance procedure that the "exhaustion principle" does not apply; therefore the
worker may file a Section 301 breach of the duty of fair representation lawsuit in federal
court). The Glover principle that resort to arbitration will not be required in duty of fair
representation cases alleging racial discrimination, is also applied to Title VII where the
courts have held that exhaustion of contractual remedies is not required. See, e.g., Evans
v. Local 2127 IBEW, 313 F. Supp. 1354, 1358 (N.D. Ga. 1969). The same holds true of
suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See, e.g., Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309,
1316 (7th Cir. 1974). Glover was seen by a number of observers as a harbinger of
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In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, the Supreme Court's concern about the
possible failure of unions to adequately and fairly represent racial minority
workers in the grievance and arbitration process was a major concern of the
Court, albeit one primarily stated in a footnote.102 Gardner-Denver therefore
primarily addressed the DFR issue and the potential resulting "lack of
harmony of interest" in cases involving the private resolution of statutory
based claims of discrimination.103
The principle of limited government intervention and self-regulation of
labor-management relations was premised on laws governing the economic
interplay of two institutional entities, namely labor organizations and
employers. These collective rights and interests-not the interests and
statutory rights of individual workers-were the overarching purpose of the
Wagner Act and Taft-Hartley Act. In the words of Professor David Feller,
the Wagner Act and Taft-Hartley Act are illustrative of "traditional labor
law."' 04 It was these institutional types of disputes that labor and
management voluntarily agreed to submit to final and binding resolution by a
private process called labor arbitration. This is the legal and public policy
context within which industrial disputes (now termed "workplace disputes")
were resolved prior to the enactment of Title VII.
B. Integration of Title VII and The ADEA in the Workplace
The enactment of Title VII created a new variable in the labor-
management and private workplace dispute resolution equation, as
distinguished from traditional labor law-which focused on institutional or
collective interests and rights. The primary and expressed focus of Title VII
is on individual statutory rights. These individual statutory rights are separate
and not dependent upon the existence of a labor organization and collective
bargaining agreement. Title VII, according to Professor David Feller, is
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co, 415 U.S. 36 (1974). The Author notes the Gardner-
Denver Court was quick to note its concern over the possible "lack of harmony of
interest" and problem of duty of fair representation in cases involving alleged racial
discrimination. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). See, e.g.,
WILLIAM B. GOULD, BLACK WORKERS IN WHITE UNIONS: JOB DISCRIMINATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 210 (1977).
101 Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 669 (1987).
102 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 n.19 (1974).
103 Id.
104 See David E. Feller, The Impact of External Law Upon Labor Arbitration, in
THE FUTURE OF LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMERICA 84 (Joy Correge et al., 5th ed., 1976).
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illustrative of what he called "employee-employer relations law," or laws that
regulate the interplay between the individual worker and his or her
employer. 0 5
1. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
In Gardner-Denver, workplace disputes involving employee-employer
relations law arose within the institutional context of a collective bargaining
agreement containing both a grievance and arbitration procedure, and a non-
discrimination provision.' 0 6 The case involved the discharge of an African-
American employee for allegedly producing an excess amount of metal
scrap.107 According to the employer, this was the basis for Harrell
Alexander's discharge.108 According to Harrell Alexander, his discharge was
unlawfully and racially motivated.' 09 In addition to the grievance, Alexander
also filed a formal external claim of racial discrimination pursuant to Title
VII. I10
The arbitrator found that Alexander's grievance lacked merit and that his
discharge was for just cause. 1 1 In light of the arbitrator's decision and the
Supreme Court's decision in the Steelworkers Trilogy,"l2 the employer
asserted that the arbitrator's award was final and binding on the parties."13
The employer further asserted that the arbitration decision had a "preclusive
effect" and that Alexander's subsequent or concurrent redress under any
otherwise applicable federal or state EEO laws was foreclosed. 114
In this landmark decision, the Supreme Court held that the arbitral award
did not have a "preclusive effect" and that Harrell Alexander may
105 Id.
106 Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 40.
107 Id. at 38.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 42.
110 Id. at 45.
111 Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 42.
112 See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
113 Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 54.
114 Id. at 55.
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concurrently and/or subsequently file a timely claim of unlawful
discrimination.1 5 Specifically, the Gardner-Denver Court concluded:
We think, therefore, that the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor
disputes and the federal policy against discriminatory employment practices
can best be accommodated by permitting an employee to pursue fully both
his remedy under the grievance-arbitration clause of a collective-bargaining
agreement and his cause of action under Title VII. The federal court should
consider the employee's claim de novo. The arbitral decision may be
admitted as evidence and accorded such weight, as the court deems
appropriate.1 16
The Gardner-Denver decision at first glance appears to be anti-
arbitration and private dispute resolution. However, the Court was very clear
that labor arbitration might still have an important function in the private
resolution of "individual factual" claims of discrimination. The Gardner-
Denver decision made a clear distinction between private resolutions of
individual statutory-based discrimination claims and contract based
discrimination grievances. 117 Thus, the Court held that an employee may
exercise his or her right to use the contractual grievance arbitration procedure
and/or the EEO administrative agency procedure to resolve his or her claim
of discrimination.118
There are, however, two points to be made in regards to the Court's
assertion of the relative "inferiority" of traditional labor arbitration as
compared to the judicial process. First, notwithstanding the Gardner-Denver
decision, discrimination grievances continue to be resolved through labor
arbitration on a regular basis.1 19 Second, as the Court stated, arbitration can
still play an important function in the resolution of individual factual claims
of discrimination. The Gardner-Denver Court seems to suggest in dicta, and
in footnote 21, that if traditional arbitration procedures were to incorporate
certain procedural and substantive due process elements, thus altering
115 Id. at 59.
116 Id. at 59-60.
I17 Id. at 48.
118 Airline Pilots Ass'n v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 477, 486 (1999) [hereinafter
called ALPA]; cf Capitol/Ford, Inc., 2002 WL 265821 (N.L.R.B.G.C.) (2002).
119 See, e.g., Michele M. Hoyman & Lamont E. Stallworth, Arbitrating
Discrimination Grievances in the Wake of Gardner-Denver, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3 (Oct.
1983) [hereinafter Hoyman and Stallworth Study].
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traditional labor arbitration procedures, the arbitral decisions may be given
"considerable evidentiary weight" if petitioned for vacatur. 120
The Court was sending a rather clear signal to labor and management to
redesign their traditional contractual grievance arbitration procedures so as to
more effectively address the concerns of the Court. These concerns included
the possible breach of a union's duty of fair representation and the possible
lack of harmony of interests. 121 Among other things, this re-designing might
also include permitting the grievant a greater degree of direct participation in
the labor arbitration process, perhaps even having separate attorney
representation and participation in the actual selection of the labor
arbitrator.122 There have been few court decisions in the labor and
120 Specifically, the Court stated:
Moreover, the grievance-arbitration machinery of the collective-bargaining
agreement remains a relatively inexpensive and expeditious means for resolving a
wide range of disputes, including claims of discriminatory employment practices.
Where the collective-bargaining agreement contains a nondiscrimination clause
similar to Title VII, and where arbitral procedures are fair and regular, arbitration
may well produce a settlement satisfactory to both employer and employee. An
employer thus has an incentive to make available the conciliatory and therapeutic
processes of arbitration which may satisfy an employee's perceived need to resort to
the judicial forum, thus saving the employer the expense and aggravation associated
with a lawsuit. For similar reasons, the employee also has a strong incentive to
arbitrate grievances, and arbitration may often eliminate those misunderstandings or
discriminatory practices that might otherwise precipitate resort to the judicial forum.
Gardner-Denver Co., supra note 104, at 55. See also William B. Gould, Labor
Arbitration of Grievances Involving Racial Discrimination, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 40, 47-48
(1969); Harry H. Platt, The Relationship Between Arbitration and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 3 GA. L. REV. 398, 1353-54(1969).
121 See, e.g., Lamont E. Stallworth & Martin Malin, Conflicts Arising Out of Work
Force Diversity, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 46TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 120 (1993).
122 The argument for third party intervention and greater direct participation by the
grievant in the arbitration has been considered as far back as the 1950's. See WILLIAM B.
GOULD, BLACK WORKERS IN WHITE UNIONS 229-34; Bernard Dunau, Employee
Participation in the Grievance Aspect of Collective Bargaining, 50 COLUM. L REV. 731-
60 (1950); Gregory J. Kamer, Employee Participation in Settlement Negotiations and
Proceedings Before OSHRC, 31 LAB. L.J. 208-22 (1980). One of the primary arguments
against the third-party intervention approach may be that it runs against the concept of
exclusivity established under the National Labor Relations Act. See, e.g., George
Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the Interests of Individual
Workers: Should Exclusivity be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 897, 909 (1975); It has
also been argued that having one's counsel or representative in a third-party intervention
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employment field that have spawned more discussion and debate than
Gardner-Denver.12 3 A number of subsequent courts have also stated that
traditional labor arbitration is a relatively inferior process for resolving
procedure could effectively operate against the grievant. Specifically because the union
may choose not to cooperate in the preparation of the case. Moreover, if there is an
apparent "tension" between the union and employer, the arbitrator may resolve doubts
against the employee. See James Atleson, Disciplinary Discharge, Arbitration, and NLRB
Defenses Deference, 20 BUFF. L. REv. 355, 357 (1971); see also Bernard Meltzer, Labor
Arbitration and Overlapping and Conflicting Remedies for Employment Discrimination,
39 U. CHI. L. REV. 30, 45 (1971). Another concern is that undesignated civil rights groups
might attempt to intervene in such disputes without being designated by the grievant. It is
interesting to note that in more contemporary times and with the benefit of the
experiences following Gardner-Denver, Gilmer, and Circuit City that the concept of
affording employees greater involvement in both the design and direct participation in
dispute resolution programs and policies has become recognized by more experts in the
field of dispute resolution. See Lisa B. Bingham, Self-Determination in Dispute System
Design and Employment Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 873, 907 (2002) (suggesting
the importance of having employees involved in the dispute resolution system design);
see also Lisa B. Bingham, Control Over Dispute-System Design and Mandatory
Commercial Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 221, 221 (2004) (calling for more
scrutiny of dispute systems that are designed by only one of the parties to see the effects).
123 The issue of the application of external law and the role of the arbitrator has
prompted considerable research and debate. In such circumstances the Parties would have
so stipulated and/or the contract would expressly indicate that external laws such as Title
VII and related case law were to be followed. However, there is debate over this issue.
See, e.g., Thomas Adair, When Should Arbitrators Follow the Federal Law: Comment, in
ARBITRATION AND THE EXPANDING ROLE OF NEUTRALS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS OF THE 23RD ANNUAL MEETING 47-54 (Gerald Somers &
Barbara Dennis eds. 1970); David E. Feller, The Impact of External Law Upon Labor
Arbitration, in THE FUTURE OF LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMERICA 83 (Joy Correge,
Virginia A. Hughes & Morris Stone eds. 1976); Bernard Meltzer, Ruminations about
Ideology, Law and Labor Arbitration, in THE ARBITRATOR, THE NLRB, AND THE COURTS:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, 20TH ANNUAL MEETING 1
30 (Dallas Jones ed. 1967); Richard Mittenthal, The Role of Law in Arbitration, in
DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN ARBITRATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 21ST
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 42, 44 (Charles
Rehmus ed. 1968); Michael Sovern, When Should Arbitrators Follow Federal Law,
ARBITRATION AND THE EXPANDING ROLE OF NEUTRALS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 23RD
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 29, 30 (Gerald Somers
& Barbara Dennis eds. 1970); Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Role of Law in Arbitration:
Discussion, in DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN ARBITRATION, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE 21ST ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 75, 77-79
(Charles Rehmus ed. 1968).
201
THE OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
statutory-based disputes.124 Accordingly, the courts have expanded the
Gardner-Denver rationale to other types of statutory-related grievances. 125
The Gardner-Denver decision prompted a general focus and debate on
what role private arbitration procedures might play in the final and binding
resolution of individual statutory based claims of discrimination arising in
the non-union setting. The first issue in the aftermath of Gardner-Denver
was whether an employer may require employees to enter into final and
binding private arbitration agreements as a condition of employment. The
second issue concerned whether such mandatory agreements to arbitrate were
enforceable in court, thereby having a "preclusive effect" on a worker
pursuing the same claim through the public justice system (i.e. EEOC and the
federal and state courts). 126 In a number of ways, this latter issue is a
variation of Gardner-Denver, but arises in the non-union setting and involves
the contractual relationship between an individual worker and his or her
employer.
2. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
The Supreme Court addressed these issues in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane.127 Gilmer involved an employee in the securities
industry who entered into what is called a "U-4" agreement as a condition of
his employment. 128 Gilmer was required by his employer to register as a
securities representative with, among others, the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE).1 29 His registration application contained, inter alia, an agreement to
arbitrate when required by NYSE rules. 130 NYSE Rule 347 provided for the
arbitration of any controversy arising out of a registered representative's
employment or termination of employment. 131
124 See Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 57 (discussing the relative inferiority of the
fact-finding process in labor arbitration compared to the judicial system).
125 See ALPA, 199 F.3d at 486-87.
126 Id. at 481-82.
127 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 24 (affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals 895 F.2d 195 (4th Cir.
1990), holding that an individual worker could be subject to compulsory arbitration
pursuant to an arbitration agreement in a securities registration application).
131 Id. at 23.
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Gilmer was terminated at age sixty-two.132 Thereafter, he filed a charge
with the EEOC and brought suit in the district court, alleging that he had
been discharged in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 (ADEA).1 33 The employer moved to compel arbitration, relying on
the agreement in Gilmer's registration application and the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA).134 The district court denied the motion based on the holding in
Gardner-Denver and also because it concluded that Congress intended to
protect ADEA claimants from a waiver of the judicial forum.135 The Court of
Appeals reversed.136
The Supreme Court held that the mandatory arbitration provision was
enforceable, thus foreclosing any recourse for Gilmer through the EEOC or
the courts. 137 In upholding the enforceability of mandatory arbitration
procedures, Gilmer is distinguished from Gardner-Denver:
In Gardner-Denver, the issue was whether a discharged employee whose
grievance had been arbitrated pursuant to an arbitration clause in a
collective bargaining agreement was precluded from subsequently bring a
Title VII action based upon the conduct that was the subject of the
grievance. In holding that the employee was not foreclosed from bringing
the Title VII claim, we stressed that an employee's contractual rights under
a collective bargaining agreement are distinct from the employee's statutory
Title VII rights:
There are several important distinctions between the Gardner-Denver line
of cases and the case before us. First, those cases did not involve the issue
of the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims. Rather,
they involved the quite different issue whether arbitration of contract-based
claims precluded subsequent judicial resolution of statutory claims. Since
the employees there had not agreed to arbitrate their statutory claims, and
132 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
133 Id. at 24.
13 4 Id. at 22.
135 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, 895 F.2d 195, 196 (1990).
1 36 Id.
137 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. Specifically, the Gilmer Court held that:
Statutory claims may be the subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable
pursuant to the FAA. Since the FAA manifests a liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration, and since neither the text nor the legislative history of the ADEA
explicitly precludes arbitration, Gilmer is bound by his agreement to arbitrate unless
he can show an inherent conflict between arbitration and the ADEA's underlying
purposes.
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the labor arbitrators were not authorized to resolve such claims, the
arbitration in those cases understandably was held not to preclude
subsequent statutory actions. Second, because the arbitration in those cases
occurred in the context of a collective bargaining agreement the claimants
were represented by their unions in the arbitration proceedings. An
important concern therefore was the tension between collective
representation and individual statutory rights, a concern not applicable to
the present case. Finally, those cases were not decided under the FAA,
which, as discussed above, reflects a "liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements." [citation omitted]. Therefore, those cases provide
no basis for refusing to enforce Gilmer's agreement to arbitrate his ADEA
claim. 138
The Gilmer decision was embraced by some employers but was
generally denounced by the plaintiffs bar, civil rights organizations, and the
EEOC.139 There are a number of ways of viewing the implications of Gilmer.
Some would agree that the decision relieves a worker of his or her civil
rights.140 Others would just as strongly argue that Gilmer benefits workers
and merely requires them to seek recourse of their individual statutory claim
in another forum, i.e. private employment arbitration.
3. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams
The question of whether the Gilmer rationale would extend to similar
situations involving mandatory arbitration agreements between an individual
worker and an individual employer was addressed in Circuit City Stores, Inc.
v. Adams. 141 In the employment application of the employer, Circuit City, a
provision existed which required all employment disputes to be resolved by
final and binding arbitration.142 After Adams was hired, he filed a state law
138 Id. at 33-35.
139 See Green, supra note 70 (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of mandatory
arbitration); Ronald Turner, Employment Discrimination, Labor and Employment
Arbitration, and the Case Against Union Waiver of the Individual Worker's Statutory
Right to a Judicial Forum, 49 EMORY L.J. 135, 141 (2000).
140 Former U.S. Senator Russell Feingold has sponsored legislation which would
reverse Gilmer and address the use of arbitration in statutory disputes. These legislative
attempts have not been successful. See Russell D. Feingold, Mandatory Arbitration:
What Process is Due?, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281, 284, 298 (2002.
141 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 108 (2001).
142 Id. at 109-10.
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employment discrimination action against Circuit City.143 Circuit City then
sued in federal court to enjoin the state-court action and to compel arbitration
pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).144 The District Court entered
the requested order.145 The Ninth Circuit reversed, interpreting the provision
of the FAA that excludes from that Act's coverage "contracts of employment
of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce" to exempt all employment contracts from the
FAA's reach.146 The Supreme Court held that the FAA exemption is
confined to transportation workers and, as in Gilmer, that the mandatory
arbitration agreement was enforceable.147
Thus, the Supreme Court's decisions in Gilmer and Circuit City further
underscore the judiciary's support of alternative dispute resolution and the
private resolution of workplace disputes-including individual statutory
based disputes. However, as suggested in Gardner-Denver, the courts remain
concerned about the fairness of such private labor and employment
arbitration policies. They continue to examine the procedural and substantive
due process elements incorporated in such programs as a condition or basis of
deciding whether to enforce what is here called "Gilmer - Circuit City" types
of mandatory arbitration policies,148 or to afford labor arbitration decisions
varying degrees of evidentiary weight pursuant to Gardner-Denver.149 A
143 Id. at I10.
'44 Id.
"45 Id.
146 Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 109-10.
147 Id. at 123-24.
148 Cole v. Bums International Security Services, et. al., 105 F.3d.1465, 1467-68
(D.C. Cir. 1997). See American Arbitration Association, Employment Due Process
Protocol, May 9, 1995, [hereinafter Due Process Protocol], available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28535. The Due Process Protocol was established in 1995
by individuals representing labor, management, employment, civil rights organizations
private administrative agencies, government and the American Arbitration Association. It
was amended, effective November 1, 2002. See also Laurie Leader & Melissa Burger,
Let's Get a Vision: Drafting Effective Arbitration Agreements In Employment and
Effecting Other Safeguards to Insure Equal Access to Justice, 8 EMPL. RTs. & EMP.
POL'Y J. 87, 107-08 (2004).
149 The Gardner-Denver Court left the door open for the trial courts to afford an
arbitral award varying degrees of evidentiary weight. Specifically, the Court stated:
We adopt no standards as to the weight to be accorded an arbitral decision, since this
must be determined in the court's discretion with regard to the facts and
circumstances of each case. Relevant factors include the existence of provisions in
the collective-bargaining agreement that conform substantially with Title VII, the
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number of employers have also attempted to impose mandatory arbitration
policies on bargaining unit employees in the union setting; however the law
is not settled on whether an employer lawfully may do this unilaterally and
without bargaining with the union. 150 It is also worth noting that the EEOC
has changed its position over time in regard to mandatory arbitration
programs. The Supreme Court held in EEOC v. Waffle House that the
existence of a private mandatory arbitration agreement does not preclude the
EEOC from pursuing an EEOC charge on the agency's own initiative. 151
4. 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett
Recently, the Supreme Court took up the issue of whether an arbitration
clause in a collective bargaining agreement that waives covered employees'
rights to file statutory discrimination claims is enforceable.152 Members of
the union had entered into an agreement whereby they would submit all
employment discrimination claims to binding arbitration.153 The agreement
further stated that this process be "the sole and exclusive remedy for
violations."l 54
Several security guards, each of whom was a member of the union and
thus bound by the agreement, filed a charge with the EEOC while the union
filed a grievance concurrently. 5 5 The employer asked the district court to
demand that the union arbitrate the claim.156 This request was denied both by
degree of procedural fairness in the arbitral forum, adequacy of the record with
respect to the issue of discrimination, and the special competence of particular
arbitrators. Whereas arbitral determination gives full consideration to an employee's
Title VII rights, a court may properly accord it great weight. This is especially true
where the issue is solely one of fact, specifically addressed by the parties and
decided by the arbitrator on the basis of an adequate record. But courts should ever
be mindful that Congress, in enacting Title VII, thought it necessary to provide a
judicial forum for the ultimate resolution of discriminatory employment claims. It is
the duty of courts to assure the full availability of this forum.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 60 n.21.
150 ALPA, 199 F.3d at 479-80 (1999); cf Capitol/Ford, Inc., 2002 WL 265821, #34
(N.L.R.B.G.C.) (2002).
151 EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 281 (2001).
152 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 251 (2009).
I53 Id.
I54 Id.
15 5 Id. at 253.
156 Id.
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the trial court and on appeal.157 In reversing the appellate court, the U.S.
Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision that "a collective-bargaining agreement
that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate ADEA
claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law."158 The Court stated that
Gardner-Denver "does not prohibit collective bargaining for arbitration of
ADEA claims," 59 and it distinguished between contract and statutory
rights.160
Most relevant to this article, however, is the Court's reaffirmation of
alternative dispute resolution as a beneficial mechanism to settle workplace
discrimination disputes. The opinion repudiated prior notions established in
Gardner-Denver that arbitration was a flawed forum, saying "[tihat
scepticism . . . rested on a misconceived view of arbitration that this Court
has since abandoned."l61
C. Governmental Endorsement of Anti-Discrimination Statutes and
ADR in the Workplace
Congress and the executive branch have also recognized the importance
and value of using alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. The EEOC and
the NLRB have enacted policies and issued regulations designed to use
ADR's potential, whereas Congress has passed legislation promoting its
benefits.
1. EEOC ADR Statement of 1995
In 1995, the EEOC adopted its policy statement on alternative dispute
resolution, stating that ADR "can provide faster, less expensive and
contentious, and more productive results in eliminating workplace
discrimination, as well as in Commission operations."l 62 The Commission
outlined four core guiding principles for its use of ADR. 163 First, any ADR
program must further the mission of the EEOC, which it describes as a dual
157 14 Penn Plaza, 556 U.S. at 253-254.
158 Id. at 273.
159 Id. at 259 n.6.
160 Id. at 268.
161 Id. at 265.
162 EEOC Statement, No. 915.002 (Jul. 17, 1995), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/adrstatement.html.
163 Id.
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mandate of "vigorously enforcing federal laws prohibiting employment
discrimination and resolving employment disputes."l 64 Second, any ADR
program must be fair in both reality and perception. This includes ensuring
the process has the following elements: voluntariness, neutrality,
confidentiality, and enforceability.165
The third guiding principle is the notion that any ADR program must be
flexible enough to respond to the diversity of challenges faced by the
Commission and its individual offices.166 One size does not fit all in terms of
implementing programs across the country. The fourth and final guiding
principle recognizes the need for training and constant evaluation of the
effectiveness of ADR programs through the EEOC.167
2. The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act (ADR) of 1998
Following a decade of experimentation with ADR, Congress passed the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998.168 This Act directed all United
States district courts to develop, by local rule, alternative dispute resolution
procedures for civil cases. 169 The courts were also given the option of
making participation in these programs mandatory.170 Even if the district
courts did not choose to do so, each one must at least "require that litigants in
all civil cases consider the use of an alternative dispute resolution process at
an appropriate stage in the litigation."' 7 1
In passing this bill Congress outlined its reasons for favoring ADR:
Congress finds that --
(1) alternative dispute resolution, when supported by the bench and bar, and
utilizing properly trained neutrals in a program adequately administered by
the court, has the potential to provide a variety of benefits, including greater
satisfaction of the parties, innovative methods of resolving disputes, and
greater efficiency in achieving settlements;
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-658 (West 2011).
169 Id. § 651(b).
170 Id. § 652(a).
171 Id.
208
[Vol. 28:1 2013]
THE PROPOSED NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION ACT
(2) certain forms of alternative dispute resolution, including mediation,
early neutral evaluation, mini-trials, and voluntary arbitration, may have
potential to reduce the large backlog of cases now pending in some Federal
courts throughout the United States, thereby allowing the courts to process
their remaining cases more efficiently; and
(3) the continued growth of Federal appellate court-annexed mediation
programs suggests that this form of alternative dispute resolution can be
equally effective in resolving disputes in the Federal trial courts; therefore,
the district courts should consider including mediation in their local
alternative dispute resolution programs. 172
The ongoing experiment with court-connected ADR programs has been a hot
topic in recent research. 173
3. NLRB Deferral To Labor Arbitration Policies
Although the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) does not expressly
spell out its relationship with ADR, Section 10(a) of the Act provided the
prelude. 174 In this section, the National Labor Relations Board is given
exclusive authority to adjudicate unfair labor practices under the Act.175 It
has used this authority for decades by allowing for arbitration deferrals in
172 H.R. 3528, 105th Cong. (2nd Sess. 1998).
173 See, e.g., Donna Shestowsky, Disputants' Preferences for Court-Connected
Dispute Resolution Procedures: Why We Should Care and Why We Know So Little, 23
OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 549, 551 (2008) (arguing "that courts should aim to gain
greater clarity about disputants' preferences, and work to deliberately implement those
preferences"). See generally Nancy A. Welsh, The Place of Court-Connected Mediation
in a Democratic Justice System, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 117 (2004) (advocating
the increased use of mediation as a complement to courts' traditional roles of facilitating
justice); John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith
Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REv. 69, 69 (2002)
(proposing the use of "dispute system design principles to develop policies satisfying the
interests of stakeholders in court-connected mediation programs"); Caroline Harris
Crowne, Note, The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998: Implementing a New
Paradigm of Justice, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1768 (2001) (suggesting ways for the Act to
uphold the integrity of alternative dispute resolution processes throughout
implementation).
174 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 160(a) (West 2011).
175 Id.
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lieu of deciding unfair labor practices (ULPs).176 In a landmark case,
Spielberg Manufacturing, the Board set out its template for post-arbitration
deferral.' 77 Four workers had been terminated for picket-line misconduct and
the case went to arbitration.178 Following hearings where the union and the
four workers actively participated, the arbitration panel denied the
grievance. 179 The union and the workers then filed ULP charges with the
Board, which ultimately dismissed the complaint.180 In its decision, the
Board stated that it was deferring to the arbitration panel's decision and
would continue to do so where: (1) the proceedings appear to have been fair
and regular; (2) all parties had agreed to be bound; and (3) the decision of the
arbitration panel was "not clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of
the Act."' 8 ' In subsequent Board decisions, a fourth prong was added: that
the ULP issue must have been addressed and considered by the
arbitrator(s).182
The Board also has a policy on pre-arbitration deferrals, first outlined in
Collyer Insulated Wire.183 This doctrine requires that: (1) an employer and a
union have a collective bargaining agreement providing for final and binding
arbitration; (2) the employer is willing to arbitrate the grievance if necessary;
(3) the employer agrees to waive any time limitations for filing charges with
the Board; and (4) the substance of the charges will be addressed through the
grievance procedure.184 Also in the pre-arbitration phase, though under
somewhat differing circumstances, is the deferral situation formed in Dubo
Manufacturing Corp.185 Unlike Collyer deferrals, Dubo deferrals are
appropriate where the grievance process has already begun.186 The Board
postpones its determination on the ULP charges pending completion of the
176 The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged the Board's authority to do this in Carey
v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 271 (1964) (citing International Harvester
Co., 138 NLRB 923, 925-26 (1962)).
177 Spielberg Manufacturing Co., 112 NLRB 1080, 1091 (1955).
178 Id. at 1083-1081.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 1081-82.
181 Id. at 1082.
182 See, e.g., Olin Corp., 268 NLRB 573 (1984).
183 Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837, 842 (1971).
184 Id. at 842-43.
185 Dubo Manufacturing Corp., 142 NLRB 431, 432 (1963).
186 Id. at 433.
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grievance process.' 87 If at any time the grievance was no longer pursued, the
Board would resume its investigation.' 88
V. THE POTENTIAL UTILITY OF PRIVATE STATUTORY TOLLING
AGREEMENTS
There are a variety of reasons related to the decision of workers to file
either an EEO charge or law suit.189 There are also a variety of reasons
related to the decision of EEO claimants and respondent employers to elect
the use of voluntary mediation and also to subsequently possibly settle the
matter at hand. 190 The decisionmaking process of EEO litigants is an area
that warrants systematic empirical research;'91 however, for the purposes of
this article, the authors submit that generally workers, and EEO complainants
in particular, are more inclined and interested in seeking alternative means of
resolving their EEO based claims, or for that matter, any workplace
statutory-based claims as opposed to pursuing the very psychologically and
economically costly formal litigation route. 192 Empirical evidence suggests,
however, that employer respondents generally are considerably less inclined
and interested in seeking resolution of workplace disputes through
mediation.193 This reality may be based on the "proximate employee and
employer relationship" and the general existence of an "imbalance of power"
in the employment relationship.194 Anecdotal evidence also suggests that
187 Id.
18 8 Id.
189 Michele Hoyman & Lamont E. Stallworth, The Arbitration of Discrimination
Grievances in the Aftermath of Gardner-Denver, 39 ARB. J. 49, 49-57 (1984).
190 Lamont E. Stallworth & Linda Stroh, Who Is Seeking To Use ADR? Why Do
They Choose To Do So, 51 DisP. RESOL. J. 30, 30-58 (1996).
191 The author is planning an empirical study to examine the decisionmaking
process of EEO litigants in regard to such issues as: the decision to use internal
organizational dispute resolution protocols or procedures; the relative degree of interest
of the complainant regarding the retaining of one's position as opposed to accepting some
type of "buyout"; and the preference for utilizing ADR processes such as ombudspersons,
external neutral investigators, and mediators, as well as arbitrators.
192 See, e.g., Stallworth & Stroh, supra note 190, at 30.
193 See Stroh & Stallworth, supra note 192, at 30-58; see also Arup Varma &
Lamont E. Stallworth, Barriers to Mediation, 55 DisP. RESOL. J. 30, 32-45 (2000).
194 Power imbalance may be described within the framework of the proximate
relationship between an employer and employee where, for example, the employer has
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employers generally would rather "litigate" or "buy out" and EEO
complainant as opposed to resolving the underlying matter and possibly
maintaining the employment relationship. 195 In such cases, the actual "act of
seeking external redress" becomes more of the basis for the desire to
terminate the employment relationship rather than the complainant-worker
exercising "external voice."196 This dynamic and reality is what the authors
refer to as the "file a charge or lawsuit and lose your job paradigm." 97
A. Private Statutory Tolling Agreements and Organizational Diversity
Policies
Given this reality, the authors suggest here that as a matter of responsible
organizational policy, as well as sound public policy, employers and public
policymakers, particularly federal and state government contractors, should
consider establishing policies which afford workers a legitimate, fair, and
non-retaliatory means for exercising "EEO voice" by adopting what the
authors call voluntary and "tolling agreements."
B. The Essential Elements ofPrivate Statutory Tolling Agreements
The proposed private tolling agreements and related organizational
conflict management policies would operate as follows and contain the
following essential elements:
1. Restatement by parties that the parties knowingly, willingly, and
voluntarily enter into the private tolling agreement.
both the superior economic strength as well as legal knowledge which far outweighs the
considerably lesser economic resources and legal knowledge of the worker or employee.
195 This results in what the author has called the "file a complaint, lose your job
paradigm." From the employers perspective the decision to resolve an EEO and
employment dispute may be viewed as primarily resolving and eliminating a "business
problem."
19 6 See ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, EXIT VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATION, AND STATEs (1970) (For an interesting and now famous book
regarding the exercising of voice). See also Michele M. Hoyman & Lamont E.
Stallworth, Who Files Suits and Why? An Empirical Portrait of the Litigious Worker, 1
U. ILL. L. REv. 115, 116-30 (1981).
197 See Lamont E. Stallworth, Employing the Law To Provide Early Access To
Conflict Management Systems and ADR: The National Employment Dispute Resolution
Act: (NEDRA) (2009) (unpublished manuscript).
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2. Reaffirmation that the parties shall comply with Agreement in
"good faith" and also seek resolution of the dispute in good faith,
i.e. "A Good Faith Pledge."
3. Parties have a right to fact-finding and limited discovery. These
private tolling agreements would constitute a "time out," or what
the authors call an "ADR cooling off period," during which the
use external (or trusted internal) fact-finders, ombudspersons,
"trusted insiders," mediators, and arbitrators can be retained to
assist the EEO/employment disputes to resolve the involved
dispute.
4. Parties agree to the timely exchange of requested relevant
documents prior to external fact-finding or mediation, for
example twenty-one (21) days.
5. The organization may impose sanctions against individuals who
knowingly provide false statements during the course of the
investigation, mediation, and arbitration of any claim submitted to
this process. Sanctions may include but not be limited to
discipline up to and including termination of employment.
6. No retaliation pledge and agreement protecting any individuals
who participate in the ADR process.
7. Specific time period for the commencement and expiration of
private tolling agreement.
8. Any settlement of the dispute shall be in writing and the settlement
shall be final and binding and enforceable in a court of competent
jurisdiction.
9. The worker claimant shall have a reasonable period of time (e.g.
21 calendar days) to consult an attorney before the tentative
settlement becomes final and binding absent any objections.
10. If the instant dispute is not resolved, the claimant may
subsequently and timely file a claim or lawsuit with the
appropriate state or federal agency or court.
C. Private Statutory Tolling Agreements
Both the ADR provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, and various other ADR public policies encourage
and support the use of ADR as an alternative to good faith traditional
litigation. Accordingly, it is fair to conclude that the fair and careful design
and implementation of enforceable "private statutory tolling agreements" is a
logical extension and means to encourage and incentives EEO/employment
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disputants to encourage attempt to resolve a wide variety of workplace
dispute without costly litigation.
There is some anecdotal evidence that private statutory tolling
agreements are already used on an ad hoc basis; however there is arguably a
need for a change in the law to reverse or clarify any court decisions or EEO
policies which raise questions regarding the appropriateness and court
enforceability of such private statutory tolling agreements. However, the
authors hasten to point out that one of the findings of an earlier empirical
study is that the availability, indeed timely use or access to ADR, enhances
the probability or likelihood that a workplace dispute will be successfully
resolved and settled.198 Accordingly, the authors are of the opinion that the
use of law to encourage, or quite frankly, "direct participation" in ADR
either at the pre-charge and lawsuit stage or post charge and lawsuit stage
would serve to better effectuate EEO/employment ADR policies and the
overarching purposes and policies of our various EEO/employment laws.
VI. THE PROPOSED NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION
ACT (NEDRA)
One of the constant themes and concerns expressed throughout this
Article is the need to make internal conflict management systems available at
198 See, e.g., Aimee Gourlay & Jenelle Soderquist, Mediation in Employment Cases
is Too Little Too Late: An Organizational Conflict Management Perspective on
Resolving Disputes, 21 HAMLINE L. REv. 261, 261-62 (1998) (encouraging use of
mediation to resolve employment disputes especially if companies change their culture of
conflict resolution); Johnathan R. Harkavy, Privatizing Workplace Justice: The Advent of
Mediation in Resolving Sexual Harassment Disputes, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 135,
150-56, 168-69 (1999) (tracing the emergence of mediation as a method to resolve
employment disputes and supporting the use of mediation in resolving sexual harassment
claims); Ann C. Hodges, Mediation and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 30 GA. L.
REV. 431 (1996) (describing the benefits of using mediation to resolve disability
discrimination claims brought pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act); Michael
J. Yelnosky, Title VII, Mediation, and Collective Action, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 583, 597-
604 (identifying the potential value of mediating Title VII claims); Carrie A. Bond, Note,
Shattering the Myth: Mediating Sexual Harassment Disputes in the Workplace, 65
FoRDRAM L. REv. 2489, 2510-33 (1997) (advocating use of mediation in sexual
harassment disputes). The EEOC's mediation program for employment discrimination
disputes has been highly touted. See Nancy Montwieler, EEOC's New Nationwide
Mediation Plan Offers Option of Informal Settlements, 29 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) C-I
(Feb. 12, 1999) (discussing the EEOC's efforts to increase the use of mediation to resolve
charges and how the EEOC's mediation program operates).
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the earliest practicable stage of an employment dispute. Despite the favorable
settlement rates of the EEOC mediation program, however, the human stories
behind these settlements might not paint an equally favorable portrait.
Specifically, by the time an EEO dispute has risen to the level of the EEOC
mediation program, four realities are likely to exist: (1) the charging party
has probably lost his or her job; (2) the charging party has felt compelled to
file an external EEO charge or lawsuit; (3) the employer and perhaps the
charging party have expended a considerable amount of time, emotion, and
money related to the dispute; and (4) as suggested earlier, even though the
matter at hand might be "settled" and the case file closed, the charging party
has forfeited his or her employment with the defendant employer as a
condition of obtaining a settlement and providing a release and waiver of any
future related claims.
This reality is troublesome and problematic because, again, this is not
how the drafters of Title VII envisioned the Act to operate. It also runs
contrary to the public interest in promoting diversity in our society and
creating organizational cultures that are "diversity competent." The early
access to legitimate internal conflict management systems, particularly
integrated conflict management systems, would greatly serve to avoid this
situation. This again is one of the underlying purposes of the National
Employment Dispute Resolution Act.
A. Rationale Behind NEDRA
Based upon these realities and the urging of others, a congressional bill
entitled the National Employment Dispute Resolution Act of 2000 (NEDRA)
was introduced in the House on June 7, 2000.199 NEDRA required federal
contractors having contracts of $200,000 or more and 20 or more employees
to establish internal dispute resolution programs that would, among other
things, provide for the early opportunity to internally resolve EEO and other
workplace disputes-ideally prior to the filing of a formal charge or
lawsuit.200
Where the dispute is not satisfactorily resolved internally, the employee
would have the option to use an outside professional mediator-similar to the
199 National Employment Dispute Resolution Act of 2000 (NEDRA), H.R. 4593,
106th Cong. (2000), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?cl 06:H.R.+4593:#.
200 Id. § 6(a)(1).
215
THE OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
REDRESS program of the U.S. Postal Service-to assist the disputants.201
The federal contractor would subsidize the cost of the mediator (i.e.,
mediator's fees and related reasonable expenses). 202 The disputants would
also be permitted to enter into a private tolling agreement and reasonable
attorney's fees may be part of any settlement.203 There are a number of issues
to be identified and addressed related to NEDRA. It is contemplated,
however, that these issues would be resolved in the adoption of any related
rules and regulations.
B. Goals and Objectives ofNEDRA
In light of the historical use of private dispute resolution processes in
resolving race and gender disputes, such as labor arbitration; the public
policy encouraging, if not favoring, the use of mediation; the documented
economic and psychological costs related to EEO and employment litigation;
and given the positive experience with EEO mediation, NEDRA was
introduced by Congresswoman Eva Clayton (D-North Carolina). (Appendix
B). 204
The fundamental goals and objectives of NEDRA are as follows:
1. To assist in the effectuation of the public policy and ADR
legislation encouraging the use of ADR, particularly mediation of
EEO and other employment disputes and "statutory-based
diversity disputes."
2. As a matter of public policy and possible Presidential Executive
Order, to require covered federal and possibly state contractors to
offer mediation to resolve EEO and other employment disputes at
an early stage.
3. As a matter of public policy, to effectively require a covered
federal contractor, and disputing worker to attempt to resolve
EEO and other employment disputes, using the assistance of a
third-party neutral, i.e., a mediator "where appropriate."
201 Id. § 6(b)(1)(A).
202 Id. § 3(bd).
203 Id. §§ 3(bd), 6(b)(5).
204 National Employment Dispute Resolution Act of 2000 (NEDRA), H.R. 4593,
106th Cong. (2000), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?dl06:h.r.04593 :#. (Appendix B).
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4. To promote the voluntary resolution of EEO and employment
disputes using a legal concept similar to the "duty to bargain" but
facilitated by the use of a third-party neutral, i.e., a mediator.
5. Participation in mediation may be required; however, all
settlement outcomes are "strictly voluntary."
6. To promote the establishment and implementation of internal
dispute resolution systems which are fair, regular, and cost-
effective and recognize the traditional proximate relationship
between employers and workers and possible existence of an
imbalance of power.
7. To fashion a cost-effective and fair dispute resolution system that
does not place an "undue burden" on either employers or workers.
8. To provide an alternative to workers which permits them the real
opportunity to resolve employment disputes internally without the
necessity of filing external charges, and pressure and/or lawsuits
while still preserving their recourse under the public policies
prohibiting discrimination and the public policy favoring ADR.
9. To decrease the number of charges and lawsuits filed with the
administrative agencies and the courts.
C. Benefits of NEDRA
The National Employment Dispute Resolution Act offers the following
benefits: -
1. Applicable statute of limitations is tolled.
2. Enhance probability of continued employment relationships.
3. Certified and qualified private and federal (FMCS) mediators may
be used.
4. Includes "certified" Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
(FMCS), state and private mediators, and "certified" ADR
providers, in a required public/private partnership.
5. Mediation provides early settlement at less economic and
psychological cost to all parties, EEO agencies, and the courts.
6. Mediation and the use of an ombudsperson provide
confidentiality.
7. The mediator's fee is subsidized by the covered federal contractor.
8. "Required," "directed," or "mandated" participation in mediation
will significantly increase the use of mediation, invariably
increasing the number of voluntary settlement agreements,
thereby decreasing the number of formal charges and lawsuits.
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9. NEDRA would increase the early use of mediation and direct
negotiations and thus decrease the number of EEO charges and
lawsuits filed. It would promote judicial efficiency by giving
employers and employees an early opportunity to "problem
solve" disputes, which in many instances are based on
misperception, misunderstanding, and miscommunications as
well as unconscious and subtle discrimination.
10. NEDRA would further effectuate the purposes and objectives of
our various federal and state EEO laws and provide a more
civilized and humane way to resolve EEO workplace disputes.
D. Mandated vs. Voluntary Participation In ADR
The cornerstone of NEDRA is the "directed participation" in mediation,
where, after the exhaustion of certain internal procedures, the worker will
have the option to submit the matter to mediation. Any settlement, however,
would be voluntary.
Classic mediation generally works best where participation in the process
is strictly voluntary. This appears to be the underlying philosophy of the
ADR provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, and the EEOC's ADR Public Policy Statement. There is not
considerable legislative history related to the ADR provisions of Americans
with Disabilities Act or the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Consequently, one
cannot state with unequivocal certainty what the drafters of these provisions
contemplated, or if they would have rejected the use of directed participation
in mediation, permitting only voluntary settlement outcomes.
However, there is sufficient empirical and anecdotal evidence that
directed participation in mediation (with only voluntary settlement outcomes)
is effective, using measures of satisfaction with the process and outcome as
indicators. 205 Empirical research studies indicate that settlement rates and
party perceptions of fairness are often comparable in both mandatory and
voluntary programs. 206 In one study on mandated participation in mediation
205 See, e.g., Jeanne M. Brett, Zoe I. Barsness & Stephen Goldberg, The
Effectiveness of Mediation: An Independent Analysis of Cases Handled by Four Major
Service Providers, 12 NEGOT. J. 259, 259-68 (1996).
206 Id.
218
[Vol. 28:1 2013]
THE PROPOSED NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION ACT
by Professors Jeanne Brett and Stephen Goldberg, the researchers found the
following:207
1. Settlement rate (78%) and degree of satisfaction are similar for
both voluntary and mandated mediations.
2. Agreement in construction mediation was as likely in mandatory
mediation as voluntary mediation.
3. The distinction between "compulsion" to enter mediation and
"compulsion" to settle mediation is crucial-only the latter is
inconsistent with mediation.
4. Mandatory settlement rates seem to resemble those of voluntary
programs.
5. Legal rules that emphasize voluntary use of mediation can
reinforce barriers to access, while one party can force another to
respond to a lawsuit.208
Notwithstanding the apparent effectiveness of ADR, there still remains
an under-utilization of internal conflict management systems, particularly at
the early pre-charge/lawsuit stage of employment disputes. A number of state
and federal district courts and courts of appeal have attempted to address the
reluctance of EEO litigants to use mediation by mandating participation of
the litigants in mediation 209 or in some form of non-binding arbitration. 210 In
207 Id. See also Roselle L. Wissler, The Effects of Mandatory Mediation: Empirical
Research on the Experience of Small Claims and Common Please Courts, 33
WILLAMETrE L. REv. 565, 576-77 (1997) (finding that based upon empirical analysis of
small claims and common pleas court cases that mandatory versus voluntary mediation
has little difference in terms of case outcome and participant evaluation, and also
demonstrated that there is little difference in outcome between mandatory versus
voluntary mediation based upon the race or sex of the litigants).
208 Brett, supra note 205, at 261-62.
209 See generally John P. McCrory, Mandated Mediation of Civil Cases in State
Courts: A Litigant's Perspective on Program Model Choices, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 813 (1999) (discussing courts mandating participation in mediation); Susan C.
Kuhn, Book Note, Mandatory Mediation: California Civil Code Section 4607, 33 EMORY
L.J. 733 (1984) (examining the Califomia statute in terms of, among other problems that
might arise from the implementation of mandatory mediation); John G. Mebane, III,
Book Note, An End to Settlement on the Courthouse Steps? Mediated Settlement
Conferences in North Carolina Superior Courts, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1857, 1857-1859
(1993); Kelly Rowe, Book Note, The Limits of the Neighborhood Justice Center: Why
Domestic Violence Cases Should Not Be Mediated, 34 EMORY L.J. 855, 856-858 (1985);
David S. Winston, Book Note, Participation Standards in Mandatory Mediation Statutes:
"You Can Lead a Horse to Water. . . ", 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DtsP. RESOL. 187, 188-90
(1996). See also Gary Smith, Unwilling Actors: Why Voluntary Mediation Works. Why
Mandatory Mediation Might Not, 36 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 847 (1998) (examining the
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those instances where state and federal courts have mandated participation in
mediation, any settlement outcome was voluntary. One of the cautionary
notes or caveats is that ADR is not presented here as a "panacea" for the
resolution of workplace civil rights disputes, nor do we recommend that all
Title VII cases should be resolved short of a trial.211
There are also a number of thoughtful scholars and practitioners who
have expressed their concerns about ADR and its potential negative impact
on women and racial minorities. 212 There is a related concern that there may
hypothesis that mandatory mediation will not operate in the same way as voluntary
mediation).
210 McCrory, supra note 209, at 815 (discussing the Ohio and Georgia mandatory
mediation court programs because these programs were underutilized when they were
voluntary).
211 For articles discussing the pros and cons of private enforcement of statutes, see
Robert Belton, A Comparative Review of Public and Private Public Enforcement of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 VAND. L. REV. 905, 961 (1978) (discussing the
pros and cons of private enforcement of statutes); Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing
Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil
Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1384-1453 (2000). See generally Michael Selmi,
Public v. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1401 (1998) (containing a "comparative empirical analysis of the effects
of private versus public enforcement of civil rights"). For articles critical of mediation
and other ADR processes, contending that such processes negatively affect access to the
public justice system, see Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085
(1984) (contending that mediation and other ADR processes negatively affect access to
the public justice system); Isabelle R. Gunning, Diversity Issues In Mediation:
Controlling Negative Cultural Myths, 1995 J. DisP. RESOL. 55, 61-62 (1995); Leo
Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public Interest: The Arbitration
Experience, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 239, 255, 302-03 (1987); Ralph Nader, The Corporate
Drive to Restrict Their Victims' Rights, 22 GONZ. L. REV. 15, 20-21, n. 211 (1986). But
see, Book Note, Mandatory Mediation and Summary Jury Trial: Guidelines for Ensuring
Fair and Effective Processes, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1086, 1095, 1104 (1990). See generally
Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacification
in the Movement to Reform Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIo ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 1 (1993); see
generally Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution
and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 211 (1995) (mapping the changing
attitudes toward ADR and adjudication).
212 There is an increasing amount of research discussing the potential negative
impact which ADR, mediation, and other informal dispute resolution processes either
might have or do have on weaker parties such as racial minorities and women. See, e.g.,
Rebecca E. Zietlow, Two Wrongs Don't Add Up to Rights: The Importance of Preserving
Due Process In Light of Recent Welfare Reform Measures, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1111,
1111-14 (1996). See also Stephen Meili & Tamara Packard, Alternative Dispute
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be a trend of establishing a type of "ADR for the Wealthy" and "ADR for the
Poor." 213 Serious consideration should be given to these concerns and the
appropriate steps should be taken to address them. The Society of
Professionals in Dispute Resolution, in its report entitled "Guidelines for the
Design of Integrated Conflict Management Systems within Organizations,"
Resolution in a New Health Care System: Will It Work for Everyone?, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON
DIsp. RESOL. 23, 30-35; Beryl Blaustone, The Conflicts of Diversity, Justice, and Peace
in the Theories of Dispute Resolution, 25 U. TOL. L. REv. 253, 259-61 n.17 (1994)
(describing a study conducted by Professor Michele Hermann that found claimants of
color received less money from mediation than in the courts, even though they were more
satisfied with the mediation process, and also finding that women did not experience any
monetary difference between mediation and the courts but women were much less
satisfied with mediation versus the courts); Joshua D. Rosenberg, In Defense of
Mediation, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 467, 467-68 (1991); LaFree & Rack, supra note 90, at 770.
See generally Christine Rack, Negotiated Justice: Gender & Ethnic Minority Bargaining
Patterns in the Metro Court Study, 20 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 211, 211-12 (1999).
See also JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAw? 144 (1983).
213 Who is Seeking to Use ADR?, supra note 190, at 30-31 (noting the tremendous
hardships placed on claimants by the EEOC's backlog and discussing how justice may be
denied due to the increasing backlog); Zietlow, supra note 212, at 1114-21 (asserting that
low-income women, particularly those of color, do not fare well in informed processes);
see also Meili & Tamara, supra note 212, at 30-35 (describing problems with ADR for
women, minorities and the poor); but see Blaustone, supra note 212, at 261 n.17
(pointing out that the argument of Delgado is not supported empirically); Gunning, supra
note 211, at 86-93; LaFree & Rack, supra note 90, at 770; Rosenberg, supra note 212, at
467-68 (asserting that Professor Grillo's account of mediation only refers to those few
bad cases and ignores good mediation experiences); see generally Rack, supra note 212,
261-62 (describing data from prior study and analyzing the negative effects in bargaining
differences for ethnic minorities, women, and those with limited bargaining power in
mediation conducted on interest-based facilitative principles); Fiss, supra note 211, at
1076-77 (arguing that ADR creates a second class system of justice where the wealth of
the parties dictates the type of justice involved because the rich do not have to settle for
anything less than the court system). See also Auerbach, supra note 212, at 144 (arguing
that alternative dispute resolution creates a two-tier system of justice with ADR being
used by the poor and the weak with weaker procedures and protections than the court
system which the rich still may pursue); Thomas A. Kochan et al., An Evaluation of the
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination Alternative Dispute Resolution
Program, 5 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 233, 245, 277 (2000) (describing wealth bias
problems associated with Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination mediation
program which required a payment of a fee and legal representation); Peter S. Adler et.
al., Guidelines for Voluntary Mediation Programs Instituted by Agencies Charged with
Enforcing Workplace Rights (Apr. 21, 1998),
http://www.mediate.com/articles/spwork.cfm (noting that SPIDR agreed that the wealth
of the participants should not matter in an agency run program).
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has made an attempt to address a number of these concerns and provide
guidance to public policymakers and decisionmakers within organizations. 214
Cornell University Professors David Lipsky and Ronald Seeber have also
extended the guidelines of the SPIDR Report in their book entitled Emerging
Systems for Managing Workplace Conflict.215 There are, however, particular
areas of concern that warrant immediate attention. These include: (1)
assuring competent legal representation and addressing the existence of the
imbalance of power; (2) assuring the actual use of a diverse corps of
workplace dispute resolvers; and (3) keeping down the costs of ADR.
VII. STRATEGIC ENACTMENT OF NEDRA
A. Experiential-Based Rationale for NEDRA and the Role ofPolitics
The experiential evidence shows that internal conflict management
systems have been generally effective in resolving workplace disputes,
including employment discrimination disputes, within contemporary
times. 216 The challenge now is how the federal government can most
effectively advance the use of conflict management and ADR to further
complete or fulfill the "Unfinished Work of Title VII." One appropriate
strategy would be the enactment of NEDRA as Congressional legislation, or
as a Presidential Executive Order, which would require federal contractors to
implement internal conflict management systems and provide EEO
disputants early access to ADR, mediation, and voluntary arbitration, as a
matter of good public policy.217
NEDRA, or legislation fashioned similar to NEDRA, would be only one
weapon in th6 arsenal to address forms of overt, unconscious, and subtle
discrimination in the workplace. NEDRA might also serve to address the
phenomena of bullying in the workplace.Furthermore, although one would
like to believe that there is a "convergence of interest" among some
214 SPIDR's ADR in the Workplace, Track I Committee, Guidelines for the Design
of Integrated Conflict Management Systems within Organizations, (August 2, 2000),
http://www.mediate.com/articIes/spidrtrackl.cfm.
215 LIPSKY & SEEBER, ET AL., supra note 77, at 11-12.
216 See, e.g., Jean T. McKelvey, Sex and the Single Arbitrator, 24 INDuS. & LAB.
REL. REv. 335, 346-52 (1971).
217 Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A. McEwen, Employing the Law to Increase the Use
of Mediation and to Encourage Direct and Early Negotiations, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 831, 864 (1997).
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employers and "fair-thinking individuals" committed to the principle of
diversity in the workplace,218 this will not in itself lead to the completion of
"The Unfinished Work of Title VII." The interest-convergence principle, as
argued by Professor Michael Green, will not likely lead to employers
voluntarily implementing legitimate conflict management systems.2 19
Research suggests that many, if not most employers are prompted to design
and implement such employment policies primarily as a result of a costly
lawsuit and resulting verdict and public exposure.220 Economics, not good
will or ethics, is the precipitating and driving factor behind such decisions. 221
Indeed, but for Brown v. Board of Education, Title VII, Executive Order
11246, and various Supreme Court decisions supporting integration and
diversity in the workplace, the demographic profile of the U.S. workforce
218 See Michael Z. Green, Addressing Race Discrimination Under Title VII After
Forty Years: The Promise ofADR as Interest-Convergence, 48 How. L. J. 937, 958 n.109
(2005) (suggesting that a priority be placed on interest-convergence while there is such a
division in the country around issues of race and no key political support for civil rights);
Michelle Adams, Shifting Sands: The Jurisprudence of Integration Past, Present, and
Future, 47 How. L. J. 795, 810 n. 81 (2004) (describing interest convergence as asserted
by Professor Derrick Bell who 'suggests that beyond whatever moral arguments may
have swayed elites in favor of desegregation, pragmatic concerns in the post-World War
II political and social climate ultimately led White elites to support desegregation"');
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 533 (1980); Derrick Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of
Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980)
(discussing the definition of interest conveyance and asserting that "[t]he interests of
blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with
the interest of white"). See also Richard Delgado, Explaining The Rise and Fall of
African American Fortunes-Interest Convergence and Civil Rights Gains, 37 HARV.
C.R.-.C.L. L. REV. 369, 371 (2002).
219 See generally, Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the
Interest-Convergence Dilemma 93 HARV. L. REv. 518 (1980) (for a discussion on the
interest-convergence principle); Justine Driver, Rethinking The Interest - Convergence
Thesis 105 Nw U. L. REV. 149 (2011). See also Colloquy, "Do the Right Thing:
Understanding the Interest - Convergence Thesis, NW. U. L. REV. (Stephen M. Feldman
ed.) (2011).
220 LIPSKY & SEEBER, supra note 77, at 228-29.
221 The employment of the law has often been used to change behavior. Laws
requiring the wearing of seat belts, prohibition of smoking in restaurants, and indeed Title
VII and Exec. Order No. 11246, 30 FR 12319 (Sept. 24, 1965) are clear examples
supporting this point.
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would not look like it does today.222 Although law might not change
attitudes, laws can change behavior.223
Notwithstanding any concern about today's Congressional political
climate,224 perhaps those employers who are referred to as "diversity
competent organizations" would see the value of conflict management
systems and strive to also become "conflict competent organizations."
Perhaps these same employers, many of whom are federal contractors, would
also support a Presidential Executive Order enacting NEDRA. It will,
however, require an "interest-convergence" to implement successfully the
goals and objectives of NEDRA, either legislatively or on a voluntary
basis. 225
B. Congressional Legislation and the Presidential Executive Order
There has been a long-standing history of enacting public policy by the
use of Presidential Executive Orders.226 For example, the Drug Free
Workplace Act 227 and Executive Order 11246 are just two examples of
Presidential Executive Orders affecting certain public policies in the
workplace. 228 Simply stated, the theory and impetus behind Presidential
222 See Mitsubishi; Women's Suit on Harassment Goes to Mediation, CHI. TRIB.,
May 21, 1997, at B2 (detailing the exclusion and underutilization of women and racial
minorities as workplace neutrals). See also Margaret Jacobs, Riding Crop and Slurs: How
Wall Street Dealt with a Sex-Bias Case, WALL ST. J., June 9, 1994; Margaret Jacobs,
Woman Claims that Arbiters of Bias Are Biased, Too, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1994;
Steven A. Holmes, Arbiters of Bias in Securities Industry have Slight Experience in
Labor Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1994, at B6; Barry Winograd, Men As Mediators in
Cases of Sexual Harassment, 50 Disp. RESOL. J. 40, 43 (1995). Also, for an article
discussing the likelihood of discriminatory arbitration selection in light of the increased
use of employment arbitration, see Sarah Rudolph Cole & E. Gary Spitko, Arbitration
and the Batson Principle, 38 GA. L. REV. 1145, 1158 (2004).
223 See generally Blumrosen supra note 10.
224 See Green, supra note 69, at 321 (asserting that given the current conservative
U.S. Congress it is doubtful that the enactment of civil rights legislation such as NEDRA
will be enacted any time soon).
225 The reach of NEDRA would be quite considerable; however federal contractors
and non-federal contractors may also voluntarily adopt and implement the basic elements
of NEDRA now.
226 See supra note 7.
227 Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100 690, 102 Stat. 4181.
228 Id. at § 2101 (requiring federal grantees and contractors to certify that they
maintain a drug-free workplace and noting that grantees must establish a written policy
224
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Executive Orders are found in Keynesian economics.229 Specifically, because
the federal government is a primary or major purchaser of goods and
services, the federal government has the economic power to influence what
will be the quid pro quo conditions under which the state or federal
government will award contracts for goods and services. These quid pro quo
agreements may also establish the terms and conditions of employment of the
workers of covered federal contractors and possibly state contractors. The
Drug Free Workplace Act and Executive Order 11246 are good examples of
quid pro quo Presidential Executive Orders. The proposed National
Employment Dispute Resolution Act (NEDRA) would fall under a similar
category.
The proposed National Employment Dispute Resolution Act may also be
advanced via the conventional Congressional legislative route or perhaps
"dual-tracked." However, because NEDRA would apply only to federal
contractors, the enactment of NEDRA as a Presidential Executive Order
would meet the "interest-convergence" of cost-conscious, litigation-weary,
and fearful employers. Moreover, many U.S. workers would welcome some
relatively user-friendly means to resolve statutory based diversity
employment disputes230 and disputes which might have a basis in subtle and
unconscious discrimination and perhaps "bullying." 231 It is these types of
disputes and reasonable accommodation disability based disputes which are
that informs employees that the unlawful possession, distribution, or manufacturing of a
controlled substance in the workplace is prohibited).
229 Margaret Weir, Ideas and Politics: The Acceptance of Keynesianism in Britain
and the United States, in THE POLITICAL POWER OF ECONOMIC IDEAS: KEYNESIANISM
ACROSS NATIONS (Peter A. Hall ed. 1989).
230 See, e.g., Lamont E. Stallworth & Martin H. Malin, Conflicts Arising Out of
Work Force Diversity, Proceedings of the National Academy of Arbitrators 104, 117-23
(1993).
231 For a review of research by other scholars, see generally McGinley, supra note
30, at 415-92. See also Emerging Cronyism, supra note 36, at 1059; Lawrence, supra
note 36, at 329-30 (describing how discrimination laws fail to deal with the realities of
unconscious racism); Allen, supra note 36, at 1299-1304 (asserting that the failure of
civil rights laws is related to the reluctance to expand the definition of discrimination to
include an objective standard that would address unconscious use of stereotypes);
Stallworth et al., supra note 36, at 37-43 (arguing that "C" charges should be mediated
rather than just dismissed because they could involve unconscious discrimination); see
also Suzy Fox & Lamont E. Stallworth, Employee Perceptions of Internal Conflict
Management Programs and ADR Processes for Preventing and Resolving Incidents:
Ethical Challenges for Decision-Makers in Organizations, 8 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J.
375, 375-405 (2004); Yelnosky, supra note 36, at 589-92.
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particularly appropriate for early resolution using private fact-finding,
mediation, and perhaps voluntary arbitration. Furthermore, notwithstanding
assertions made about the current political climate in Washington, D.C.,232
the advancement of NEDRA presents a "win-win" opportunity for the
current-or any future-administration.
VIII. THE NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION ACT MODEL
AND THE "EARLY RESOLUTION" OF VETERANS' DISABILITY BASED
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION REQUESTS
A. The Theoretical Utility and Application ofNEDRA
The potential utility of the National Employment Dispute Resolution Act
(NEDRA) can be most readily demonstrated if it were applied to cover
federal contractors that employee Iraqui and Afghanistan War Veterans.
Many of these veterans are dealing with military-related disabilities. Some of
these disabilities are "visible physical disabilities," such as the loss of arms
and legs. However, an increasing number of these disabilities are what the
authors call "non-visible disabilities." Included among these non-visible
disabilities are post-traumatic stress disorder or injuries (or illness), traumatic
brain injuries, depression, and diabetes. 233
A number of non-federal contractor employers, including those
employers that would be covered by NEDRA, do not have the knowledge
and expertise to effectively understand and handle the work related issues,
and need to reasonably accommodate the legitimate needs of veterans with
disabilities. In addition, in some, if not many, instances veterans dealing with
"non-visible disabilities" might even be suspected of feigning disabilities or
being malingerers. This may be particularly the case in instances involving
Black/African-American and Hispanic veterans. 234
232 See, e.g., Green, supra note 69, at 321.
233 Professor Lamont Stallworth is developing an applied empirical ADR research
project to explore the design and implementation of a pilot project affording veterans
with disabilities "early access" to "ADA fact-finders and mediators.
234 There is an increasing awareness that a number of disabilities now covered by
the Americans with Disabilities Act, as amended, are not the usual thought of "visible
physical" disabilities. In the aftermath of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars many war
veterans are returning with such "invisible disabilities" as depression post-traumatic
stress disorder, traumatic brain injury, diabetes traumatic mental illness, etc. However,
professionals and disability advocate groups are actively educating employers and the
general public about this growing area of invisible disabilities areas. See, e.g., Equip for
226
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This situation is even further complicated or compounded where veterans
with disabilities are not fully aware and knowledgeable of their rights under
applicable state and federal disability laws.235 Furthermore, in many
instances, veterans with disabilities may not know what specific modes of
effective reasonable accommodations might be available to them in order to
facilitate their remaining on the job and maintaining their employment.
Under this scenario, the employer may be more inclined to terminate
unnecessarily the employment relationship of a veteran with a covered
disability. The veteran with the covered disabilities may be more inclined to
"walk away" from his or her position and thus further contribute to the
already high unemployment rate of Iraqui and Afghanistan veterans as well
as non-veteran disabled individuals, generally.
The authors hasten to point out that in many instances an already
emotionally beleaguered veteran may not possess the wherewithal to be his
Equality, Employment Legal Briefings: Invisible Disabilities and the ADA, Brief No. 13,
(June 2010) (DBTAC Great Lakes ADA Center). The authors suggest here that given the
phenomenon of "unconscious bias" that many employers will be (or are) inclined to
assume or suspect minority veterans, particularly Blacks and Hispanics as feigning a
disability and being malingerers. See generally McGinley, supra note 30. See also
McGinley, supra note 36 at 1003; Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 329-30 (1987)
(describing how discrimination laws fail to deal with the realities of unconscious racism);
Jessie Allen, Note, A Possible Remedy for Unthinking Discrimination, 61 BROOK. L.
REv. 1299, 1299-1304 (1995) (asserting that the failure of civil rights laws is related to
the reluctance to expand the definition of discrimination to include an objective standard
that would address unconscious use of stereotypes). It is suggested that the involvement
of a third party neutral "early on" pursuant to the proposed National Employment Dispute
Resolution Act will serve to better and more effectively address this serious problem.
It has been asserted by one experienced plaintiff attorney that there seems to be a
pattern of employers challenging reasonable accommodation requests made by racial
minorities, particularly Black/African-Americans and Hispanics. The basis of these
challenges is that these individuals are feigning disabilities and are malingerers,
particularly in cases involving non-visible disabilities such as post-traumatic stress
disorder, depression and diabetes. Regretfully, in our society there appears to be a
"presumption of wrongdoing" on the part of African Americans. One example of this was
the arrest of African American Harvard Professor Henry Louis Gates as he was entering
his home in Cambridge, Massachusetts. This regrettable incident became the basis of
book by Harvard Law professor Charles Ogletree. See CHARLES OGLETREE, THE
PRESUMPTION OF GUILT: THE ARREST OF HENRY Louis GATES JR. AND RACE, CLASS AND
CRIME IN AMERICA 129-243 (2012).
235 See, e.g., The Americans with Disabilities Act Amended, The Vocational
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as well as various state and city disability statutes and policies
as well as the Family and Medical Leave Act.
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or her own advocate in such situations and consequently elect not to engage
his or her employer in what is called the required "interactive process" under
the Americans with Disabilities Act Amended and other state disabilities
statutes.
B. The Applied and Practical Utility of NEDRA: CAREY SALT
COMPANY CASE
One reported instance of the need for the employer cooperation in a
reasonable accommodation matter involved the Carey Salt Company. This
dispute involved the need of a veteran with disabilities to be away from work
in order to obtain medical treatment related to his covered disability. This
dispute would have had a significantly better likelihood of being resolved
under the proposed National Employment Dispute Resolution Act (NEDRA)
model or scheme. Specifically, the involved veteran or veterans could have
sought internal redress or assistance via an integrated conflict management
system or internal grievance procedure affording the involved veteran to an
experienced third party neutral such as an "ADR mediator". Both the covered
employer and the involved veteran would (or could) voluntarily enter into a
private statutory tolling agreement. This would have: provided what the
authors call an "ADR Cooling Off Period." During this "ADR cooling off
period," the involved veteran would not feel pressured or compelled to seek
costly external redress under an applicable state or federal disability law or
the FMLA.
Assuming that the covered employer and the involved veteran were to
select an experienced and independent workplace neutral (i.e., fact-finder or
mediator) who is knowledgeable about the ADAA and various modes of
reasonable accommodation, the disputants could have most or more likely
engaged in the statutory required "interactive process" early on with less
emotional stress, animosity, and monetary costs and more- importantly
maintained his employment relationship.236 For some reason, employers and
veterans are often not able to arrive at a mutually acceptable mode of
reasonable accommodation. Consequently, a number of benefits would have
been attained by having "early" access to a third party neutral. These benefits
include, but are not limited to, the following:
236 For an excellent article regarding the practical utility of using a mediator in
negotiations, see generally Robert A. Baruch Bush, What Do We Need A Mediator For?:
Mediation's "Value-Added"for Negotiators," 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (1996).
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1. The disputants would spare to cost in terms of time, expense, and
acrimony in litigating this matter.
2. The use of a specially trained and experienced "ADA workplace
neutral" would have provided a form of "day in court" for both
the employee with disability and his or her employer.
3. Other employees and workers with covered disabilities would be
provided significant comfort in knowing that there was a "fair and
just" internal forum in which their disability based reasonable
accommodation requests could be timely resolved without the
employee losing his or her employment position.
4. The "early" fair and just resolution of these disputes pursuant to
the NEDRA model would serve to better effectuate the
Americans with Disabilities Act Amended, particularly the ADR
provisions of the earlier Act.
As reported by Veterans For Common Sense: unfortunately, some
companies are not upholding their end in accommodating the needs of
veterans with disabilities.237 According to Veterans For Common Sense,
veterans are losing their jobs or are put under pressure at work because they
seek time to receive service-related care or to serve military deployments. 238
This happens despite the Soldiers and Sailors Employment Act requiring
employers to hold a service member's job when they deploy and to give them
time to fulfill military obligations.
CAREY SALT COMPANY FACTS
In January, Carey Salt Company, a subsidiary of Compass Minerals
International, Inc., terminated employee Derrick Forestier, a Bronze Star
recipient, who retired as a Sergeant First-Class after 24 years in the U.S.
Army. Forestier's tour of duty included three combat tours in five
deployments. Forestier sought time off from work to receive required
medical treatment at a Veterans' Administration (VA) facility for a military
service-connected issue. The company was notified of this condition before
hiring him. Forestier contended that he was fired because the company
believed his absences to attend his Veterans' Administration (VA)
appointments created work place problems. The United Steelworkers Union
237 Team VCS, VCS Joins with USW to Protect Veterans at Work, VETERANS FOR
COMMON SENSE (July 12, 2012), available at
http://veteransforcommonsense.org/2012/07/12/vcs-joins-with-usw-to-protect-veterans-
at-work/.
238 Id..
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became involved in this matter and took up the fight in Louisiana, where
Forestier was employed. The Union is currently investigating whether there
are other possible cases of mistreatment of veterans by this company in other
locations. 239
C. The View of Veterans For Common Sense and NEDRA
The opinion of the Steelworkers Union and the Veterans For Common
Sense underscore the practical utility of "early access" to integrated conflict
management systems and access to external "ADA fact-finders or mediation"
in reasonable accommodation disputes involving veterans.
In the Carey Salt Company case, the authors are of the opinion that the
early use of a third party neutral using facilitation, mediation, or even
binding mediation would have greatly enhanced the likelihood of
accommodating the needs of Derrick Forestier. And in the alternative, a third
party neutral using binding mediation could have concluded that the
accommodation of Mr. Forestier created an undue hardship for Carey Salt
Company. Either way, the reasonable accommodation dispute would have
brought some timely and just closure.
The comments of Veterans For Common Sense lend further support for
the early access to ADR in Veterans disability reasonable accommodation
cases. The comments of this veterans' organization are set forth below:
Those who serve or have served America in the military have a hard enough
job and they sacrificed much for the country. It is not too much to ask an
employer that they be given time off to continue to serve or to seek
necessary treatment for conditions resulting from their service. We have to
protect those who serve if we expect them to protect us when the nation
requests it. Support the troops is not just a slogan, this is the right thing to
do for our brave men and women.
239 Id. (referencing a letter from Rep. Lloyd Dogget, to J.M. Breaux, Director,
United Steelworkers District 13, which is on file with the United Steelworkers. Rep.
Lloyd Doggett (D-TX), who sponsored the Wounded Veteran Job Security Act to protect
veterans from losing their jobs for seeking treatment for service-related conditions, said:
"No veteran should have to stand in front of their employer after suffering an injury while
serving the red, white, and blue and be given a pink slip. Workers and veterans like
Derrick Forestier, an Army Sergeant First Class who served 24 years on active duty,
including three combat tours of duty and five deployments, should not be forced to
choose between keeping a job or receiving the veteran's benefits he rightfully earned."
Team VCS, supra note 237.).
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The authors submit that affording veterans with disabilities "early
access" to ADR, including workplace neutrals as would be provided by the
model of NEDRA, would immediately assist many veterans with disabilities
who urgently need and deserve assistance.
IX. CONCLUSION
There are many documented reasons to support affording
EEO/employment disputants "early access" to legitimate internal conflict
management systems, particularly integrated conflict management systems.
From the perspective of worker-complainants, the costs related to defending
such claims are substantial. From the workers' perspective, there is both a
considerable economic and psychological cost related to the late and
protracted resolution of EEO/employment disputes. This is particularly the
case given the difficulties workers have in obtaining legal representation and
proving unlawfully motivated discrimination, especially in cases stemming
from unconscious, subtle, and modern discrimination. Furthermore, in light
of the findings of Professors Eisenberg and Schwab, it appears that even
where plaintiffs prevail in a Title VII case, there is a greater probability that
his or her favorable verdict will be reversed upon appeal.
In addition, experience tells us that one other practical reality is the
dynamic of "file a charge or lawsuit and lose your job," which has become a
general fact of life.240 This is generally the case even where the matter is
brought to closure through mediation at the EEOC mediation program stage,
where the adage "too little, too late" applies. This result also runs counter to
240 One of the major concerns of employers and their attorneys is that the retention
of an individual worker and professional employee who has either filed an EEO charge or
law suit will prompt future claims of retaliation or as one experienced employei attorney
averred, such employees are cases of "pre-taliation."
The authors suggest that one strategy to address this very real concern would be for
the respondent employer and complaining and retained employee to enter into voluntarily
a "pre-dispute" mediation and final and binding arbitration agreement that would require
the retained employee to have any and all future employment disputes resolved through
the use of mediation and where mediation does not resolve the matter, the dispute shall be
resolved through final and binding arbitration as contemplated by the Supreme Court in
Gilmer vs. Interstate Johnson Lane, 500 U.S. 20 (1991) and Circuit City vs. Adams 532
U.S. 105 (2001).
The authors are of the opinion that the voluntary entering into the proposed pre-
dispute final and binding arbitration agreement would not constitute "disparate treatment"
or retaliation, particularly when weighed against the complaining worker or otherwise
"pre-taliation" worker permanently losing employment with his or her employer.
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this country's recognition and commitment to diversity in our society and in
the workplace. This result further runs afoul of Supreme Court's recognition
of diversity as being a matter of "public interest and policy."
Given these realities and the prism which has been etched out in this
article, it follows that from a very practical perspective it behooves all of the
interested stakeholders, including public policy makers, to appreciate the role
which legitimate internal conflict management systems (particularly
integrated conflict management systems) can play, as one of the significant
factors, in fulfilling the "Unfinished Work of Title VII," and in providing a
more meaningful, effective, and practical form of workplace justice. The
proposed National Employment Dispute Resolution Act (NEDRA) is just one
possible means to effectuate these purposes.
X. APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
An Example of A Model Private Statutory Tolling Agreement
The Undersigned Parties knowingly and willingly enter into the instant
"Private Tolling Agreement" freezing the otherwise applicable statutory time
limits related to the allegation/claim that the statutory rights of
(Name of Individual) arising under the
following state or federal statute(s):
;_ ; and
have been violated. The statutory timely filing of this
claim or lawsuit would normally commence as of
(Date) and expire on .
The Undersigned Parties acknowledge that
(Name of Individual) has knowingly, willingly, and voluntarily elected to
seek redress and resolution of his or her contract grievance and the above-
referenced statutory-based claim pursuant to the conflict management and
ADR procedures established by ABC Employer (and XYZ labor
organization). The Undersigned Parties, including the grievant, further agree
that during this period of time any and all relevant documents, including
witness statements, shall be preserved and not destroyed and made available
to either Party during the period of time set aside for this ADR protocol and
thereafter. The Parties also affirm that they have voluntarily elected to seek
internal resolution of the instant dispute in "good faith."
The Undersigned Parties further agree that they will engage in "good
faith" fact-finding and limited discovery in exchanging any relevant
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evidence, documents, witness (fact-finding, arbitration, etc.) statements and
relevant medical and health records prior to the scheduled mediation and at
least twenty-one (21) calendar days prior to the scheduled mediation or ADR
session. Where requests are made for medical and health records, the
providing of such information shall be made only in compliance with
applicable state and federal privacy laws and with the signed release of the
individual to whom these records personally apply or his or her family
member or domestic partner having such authority.
The Undersigned Parties further agree and affirm that no individual,
including the claimant and his or her witnesses or participants in this internal
dispute resolution protocol shall be subject to any form of retaliation or
discriminatory treatment due to his or her participation in this private internal
ADR protocol.
The Undersigned Parties further agree that the time period for which they
shall seek to resolve in "good faith" the instant matter pursuant to the
applicable ADR procedures shall be between (Date)
to _ (Date), unless otherwise mutually and formally
extended.
The Undersigned Parties further agree that any settlement or resolution
reached pursuant to the applicable ADR protocol shall be in writing and shall
be final and binding upon (Name of individual),
(Name) Employer ABC and, where applicable, the
Undersigned labor organization representing (Name of
Individual).
The Undersigned Parties further acknowledge that each side has been (or
will be) afforded a reasonable period of time, not to exceed twenty-one (21)
calendar days, to obtain legal advice regarding the instant private tolling
agreement. Absent formal written objections being raised, the instant
agreement shall take force.
Lastly, the Undersigned Parties agree and affirm that if the instant
dispute is not resolved using the agreed upon ADR process and protocol as
set forth in that (Name of Individual) shall have
days or until (blank date) to file a
charge or claim with the state or federal administrative agency or state or
federal court having appropriate jurisdiction of the claims raised by
(Name of individual). The worker-
complainants' failure to timely file such legal actions shall constitute the
final waiver of such claims and preclude (Individual)
from seeking any further external legal redress or recourse pursuant to any
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current collective bargaining agreement or organizational internal grievance
and arbitration procedure.
The above terms and conditions constitute the full and final terms of the
instant "statutory private tolling agreement."
XYZ Employee ABC Employer
Date Date
Notarized Notarized
Witness and/or Attorney Attorney/Legal Counsel
for the Individual for the Employer
Date Date
XYZ Labor Organization Representative of the Grievant
Date Date
APPENDIX B
The Proposed National Employment Dispute
Resolution Act of 2000 (NEDRA)
The Proposed National Employment Dispute Resolution Act of 2000
(NEDRA) 106th Congress, 2d Session, H.R. 4593, to amend title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, the Vocational
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, to require the
Equal EmploymentOpportunity Commission to mediate employee claims
arising under such Acts, and for other purposes.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
June 7, 2000
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Mrs. Clayton introduced the bill which was referred to the Committee on
Education and the Workforce.
A BILL
To amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
to require the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to mediate
employee claims arising under such Acts, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House ofRepresentatives of the United States
ofAmerica in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "National Employment Dispute Resolution Act
of 2000 (NEDRA)."
SECTION 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds the following:
(1) The prohibitive costs and emotional toll of litigation as well as the
growing backlog of employment civil rights claims and lawsuits has impeded
the protection and enforcement of workplace civil rights.
(2) Mediation is an economical, participatory, and expeditious alternative to
traditional, less cooperative methods of resolving employment disputes.
(3) Mediation enables disputants to craft creative solutions and settlements,
surpassing the reach of traditional remedies, thereby possibly protecting the
continuity of the employment relationship.
(4) As we enter the new millennium, a national program of directed or
required participation in mediation where any settlement is voluntary
mandated mediation for certain employment and contract disputes, will help
fulfill the goal of equal opportunity in work and business places of the United
States.
(5) Overt and subtle discrimination still exists in our society and in the
workplace.
(6) Overt and subtle forms of discrimination cause measurable economic and
noneconomic costs to employers and the American workforce, create a
barrier to fully realizing equal opportunity in the workplace, and are contrary
to public policy promoting equal opportunity in the workplace.
(b) PURPOSES-The Purposes of this Act are-
(1) to establish a fair and effective alternative means by which employees
and covered employers may have an increased likelihood of resolving both
alleged overt and subtle forms or acts of discrimination without the necessity
of the employee taking some form of legal action against the employer,
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(2) in accordance with the various public policies encouraging the use of
mediation, to make mediation available at an early stage of an employment
dispute, thus:
(A) possibly reducing economic and noneconomic costs,
(B) preserving the employment relationship and decreasing acrimony, and
220 Arbitration 2007
(C) decreasing the filing of a number of formal discrimination complaints,
charges, and lawsuits and further burdening our public justice system, and
(3) to provide that the participation in mediation shall not preclude either the
employee-disputant or covered employer-disputant from having access to the
public justice system.
SECTION 3. AMENDMENTS TO TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964.
(a) FEDERAL EMPLOYEES-Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.) is amended-
(1) in section 706(a) by inserting after the 7th sentence the
following:
'Regardless of whether the Commission makes an investigation under this
subsection, the Commission shall provide counseling services regarding, and
endeavor to responsibly address and resolve, claims of unlawful
discrimination using certified contract mediators.', and
(2) in section 711(a) by adding at the end of the following:
'Every employer, employment agency, and labor organization shall provide
to each employee and each member, individually, a copy of the materials
required by this section to be so posted.'
(b) OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE-Section
718 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-17)
is amended-
(1) By inserting '(a)' after 'SEC. 718', and
(2) By adding at the end the following:
'(b) The Office of Federal Contract Compliance shall endeavor to
responsibly address and resolve any alleged discrimination using mediation
with respect to which this section applies.
'(c) An employer who establishes, implements an approved internal conflict
management program or system providing the use of a certified mediator
participates in mediation under this section shall be given preferred status in
contract bidding for additional and for maintaining current Federal
Government contracts.
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'(d) An employer who is a party to a Government contract or the agency of
the United States shall, assume -the costs of mediation under this section,
including the fees of the mediator and any travel and lodging expenses of the
employee, if such travel exceeds 25 miles, one way. Any settlement shall
include, among other things, any appropriate and reasonable attorney fees.
'(e) Retaliation by an employer who is a party to a Government contract or
the agency of the United- States; or the destruction of evidence, shall result in
the imposition of appropriate civil or criminal sanctions. The participation in
mediation shall be at the option of. the employee. The participation in
mediation shall not preclude the employee's access to any State, local, or
Federal EEO enforcement agency or any State or Federal court.
'(f) The Office of Federal Contract Compliance shall have authority over
employers who are parties to Government contracts that fail to comply with
this section. Failure to comply shall result in the loss of, a current
Government contract. and disqualification from consideration for future
Government contracts.
'(g) No resolution by the disputants may contravene the provisions of a valid
collective bargaining agreement between an employer who is part to a
Government contract and a labor union or certified bargaining representative.
Any voluntary settlement outcome and agreement may not be in conflict with
the collective bargaining agreement.'
SECTION 4. AMENDMENTS TO THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C.
621 et seq.) is amended-
(1) in section 7(e) by inserting after the 2d sentence the following:
'The Commission shall provide counseling services regarding, and endeavor
to responsibly address and resolve, claims of unlawful discrimination using
certified contract mediators.', and
(2) in section 8 by adding at the end the following:
'Every employer, employment agency, and labor organization shall provide
to each employee and each member, individually, a copy of the materials
required by this section to be so posted.'
SECTION 5. AMENDMENT TO AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT OF 1990.
Section 107(a) of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C.
12117(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
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'The Commission shall provide counseling services regarding, and endeavor
to responsibly address and resolve, claims of unlawful discrimination using
certified contract mediators.'
SECTION 6. MEDIATION.
(a) DEFINITIONS-For purposes of this section:
(1) The term 'employer' means any Federal agency (including Federal
courts) or business enterprise receiving Federal funds of $200,000 or greater
or having 20 or more employees.
(2) The term 'mediator' means any neutral, third-party, including an attorney
and a non attorney, who is trained in the mediation process and has a
demonstrable working knowledge in relevant EEO and employment law,
including a third party who is-
(A) appointed or approved by a competent court, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, a certified mediation center, or a university, or
(B) jointly chosen by the disputants.
(3) The term 'trained mediation professional' means a person who-
(A) has participated in employment mediation training of 40 or more hours,
or
(B) has co-mediated with or been supervised by another trained certified
mediation professional for at least three employment or contract dispute
cases of no fewer than 15 hours.(4) The term 'certified mediation center'
includes any private or public entity that is qualified to facilitate the
employment or contract mediation process and provide training on
employment and contract dispute resolution, including, but not limited to, the
American Arbitration Association, the American Bar Association, the Center
for Employment Dispute Resolution, CPR Conflict Institute,
JAMS/Endispute, United States Arbitration and Mediation, Inc., Institute on
Conflict Resolution at Cornell University, and the Society of Professionals in
Dispute Resolution.
(b) REQUIREMENTS-(1) All employers shall-
(A) establish an internal dispute resolution program or system that provides,
as a voluntary option, employee-disputant access to external third-party
certified mediators,
(B) participate in mediation if the employee has exhausted the internal
dispute resolution program or system and has formally requested mediation
without the filing of a charge or lawsuit, and
(C) participate in mediation if the claimant has filed a charge or lawsuit and
the claimant formally requests mediation.
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(2) While the mediation settlement outcome would be voluntary, the
employer shall participate in mediation where the employee-disputant has
expressed a desire to mediate.
(3) Under all circumstances, the employee-disputant is entitled to legal
representation.
(4) Employers shall inform employee-disputants of the mediation alternative
and their respective rights thereof, and the employee-disputant would have
30 days in which to decide whether to participate in mediation.
(5) When an employee-disputant voluntarily agrees to participate in the
mediation process, any applicable statute of limitations shall be tolled, and
the private tolling agreement shall be enforceable in any court of competent
jurisdiction.
(6) The employee and employer disputants shall not have more than 90 days
within which to resolve the dispute.
(7) Should mediation prove unsuccessful, the employer shall again inform
the employee-disputant of their rights, in writing, including the right to
pursue the matter under any applicable State, county, local ordinance, or
Federal statutes.
(8) Consistent with section 705 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, and any State or local authority
involved in proceedings described in section 706, shall offer technical
assistance to any unrepresented or self-represented party, provided that a
formal complaint has been filed with the Commission or such authority. Such
assistance shall include, but not be limited to-
(A) pre-mediation counseling,
(B) assistance in understanding the status of relevant case law,
(C) assistance in what would be the appropriate remedy if the instant claim
were to be found to have merit, and
(D) assistance in drafting any post-mediation settlement agreement or
resolution.
(9) Submission of a claim for mediation shall not preclude either the claimant
or respondent from seeking other appropriate relief on that claim, except that
neither party shall seek other relief until the mediation process has
concluded.
(10) Any settlement as a result of the mediation process shall be strictly
voluntary and remain confidential except for research and evaluation
purposes.
(11) In every case, the privacy, privilege, and confidentiality of all parties to
the dispute shall be preserved, including complaint intake personnel and
mediation consultations.
(c) ATTORNEY'S OBLIGATION TO ADVISE CLIENTS OF
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MEDIATION-For the purposes of this Act and all of the other related
statutes, attorneys and consultants are legally obliged to advise their clients
of the existence of the mediation alternative and their obligations under the
Act to participate in mediation in "good faith."
(d) JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT-Either party to a mediation agreement to
bring an action of enforcement in a Federal district court of competent
jurisdiction, however any matter discussed or material presented during
mediation shall not be used in any subsequent local, State, or Federal
administrative or court proceeding. The confidential provisions of any
internal conflict management program or system or agreement to mediations
shall be immune from attack by any third party.
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